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ABSTRACT 
Scholars and judges agree on the importance of constitutional 
approval—that is, people’s subjective support for their constitution. The 
Supreme Court has asserted that it owes its very legitimacy to popular 
backing for its decisions. Academic luminaries have concurred, while also 
connecting constitutional approval to constitutional compliance and 
durability, as well as the easing of the countermajoritarian difficulty. 
Until now, though, no information has been available on either the 
levels or the causes of constitutional support. In this Article, we rectify this 
shortcoming by presenting the results of a nationally representative survey 
that we conducted in late 2014. The survey asked respondents about their 
approval of the federal Constitution and of their state constitution, and 
about several potential bases for support. We also supplemented the 
survey by coding dozens of features of state constitutions. This coding 
allows us to test hypotheses about the relationship between constitutional 
content and constitutional backing. 
What we find is illuminating. First, people highly approve of their 
constitutions—the federal charter more so than its state counterparts. 
Second, approval is unrelated to what constitutions say; it does not budge 
as their provisions become more or less congruent with respondents’ 
preferences. Third, approval is only weakly linked to respondents’ 
demographic attributes. And fourth, the most potent drivers of approval 
are constitutional familiarity and pride in one’s state or country. To know 
it—and to be proud of it—is to love it. 
 
 
  Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, and Associate Professor of 
Law, University of Virginia School of Law. We are grateful to Richard Albert, Adam Chilton, 
Brandon Garrett, Tom Ginsburg, Risa Goluboff, David Landau, Sandy Levinson, Gregg Mitchell, John 
Monahan, Sharon Rush, George Rutherglen, Danny Sokol, Doug Spencer, Rich Schragger, Reedy 
Swanson, Mark Tushnet, Ozan Varol, and Emily Zackin for their helpful comments. Our thanks also to 
workshop participants at the 2015 conference of the International Society for Public Law, Hebrew 
University, Queen’s University, and the University of Florida, where we presented earlier versions of 
the Article. We are pleased as well to acknowledge the support of the Robert Helman Law and Public 
Policy Fund at the University of Chicago, whose generosity helped to cover the survey’s costs. And 
we benefited from excellent research assistance from Charles Doriean, Vahid Gholampour, Lucas 
Kowalczyk, Terry Martin, and Keiko Rose.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
114 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:113 
 
 
 
 
These results unsettle several literatures. They mean that people form 
opinions about constitutions differently than about other institutions. They 
also mean that comparativists may be going down a blind alley as they 
focus ever more intently on constitutional design. But perhaps our study’s 
clearest implication is for leaders who value popular support for their 
constitution. Our advice to them is to forget about constitutional change, 
and instead to try to build the public’s knowledge and appreciation of the 
charter. Constitutional approval, like statecraft, is ultimately a project of 
soulcraft.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Justice Kennedy concluded his opinion with a flourish in a landmark 
2005 case. “Over time, from one generation to the next,” he declared, “the 
Constitution has come to earn the high respect and even, as Madison dared 
to hope, the veneration of the American people.”1 But has it? Do 
Americans actually feel “high respect” and “veneration” for their federal 
Constitution? And if so, what about their other constitutions—the charters 
that structure the governments of the fifty states? Do Americans prize 
them too? 
Justice Kennedy also offered an intriguing explanation for the support 
(allegedly) enjoyed by the federal Constitution. Its “doctrines and 
guarantees”—federalism, the separation of powers, the Bill of Rights, and 
so on—are “essential to our present-day self-definition and national 
identity.”2 “Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is 
because we know it to be our own.”3 But is this, in fact, why we honor it? 
Does our allegiance stem from its congruence with our values, or from 
something else entirely? And even if Justice Kennedy is right about the 
cause of federal constitutional approval, does his claim hold for the states 
as well?  
In this Article, we begin to answer these questions. We do so not just 
because they are prompted by Justice Kennedy’s ruminations, but also 
because support for the constitution is a critical—and critically 
understudied—concept. Luminaries from the bench and academia have 
argued that it is a key driver of constitutional legitimacy: that is, the 
loyalty a charter commands from its constituents. These observers also 
have linked it to constitutional compliance, durability, and status as law, as 
well as the easing of the countermajoritarian difficulty.
4
 But to date, no 
one has tried to measure it, to determine what the levels and causes of 
constitutional approval actually are. This empirical project is the linchpin 
of this Article. 
Our methodology is straightforward.
5
 To find out whether and why 
people support their constitutions, we simply asked them. In October 
 
 
 1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).  
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See infra Part I (providing background on theory and empirics of institutional approval). 
 5. See infra Part II (explaining methodology). 
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2014, we carried out a nationally representative survey with roughly 2,000 
respondents, two questions of which were to what extent people approve 
of the federal Constitution and of their state constitution. The survey also 
included questions about an array of potential bases for support: 
demographic attributes (gender, age, race, education, and income), civic 
knowledge (about the constitution specifically and the news generally), 
and institutional attitudes (toward one’s state, country, and party). 
In isolation, though, the survey would have been unable to test some 
of the most salient hypotheses about constitutional approval—such as 
Justice Kennedy’s claim that it follows from consistency with people’s 
preferences. We therefore supplemented the survey by coding many of the 
features of the fifty state constitutions. We tracked whether or not they 
contain twenty-nine substantive provisions, as well as their age, length, 
and amendment frequency. The latter three variables slide directly into our 
analyses, while we pair the former with questions from our poll to create a 
measure of congruence. That is, we compare the provisions that each 
respondent wants in her state constitution with the provisions actually in 
the document, and so determine how closely it reflects her views. 
We find, first, that Americans generally back their constitutions, 
though to different extents at the federal and state levels. The federal 
Constitution achieves an average approval score of 7.8 out of 10, while 
state constitutions earn a somewhat lower rating of 6.7. Constitutional 
support also does not vary much geographically. The federal Constitution 
is most popular in Idaho and least popular in Vermont, while Wyoming 
residents are happiest with their state constitution and Mississippians are 
least pleased with theirs. None of these state-level averages diverges very 
far from the national mean.
6
 
But the existence of constitutional approval is less interesting than its 
explanations. To identify them, we build regression models in stages for 
both federal and state constitutional support.
7
 We add, in turn, each of our 
five sets of hypotheses, involving (1) demographic attributes, (2) civic 
knowledge, (3) institutional attitudes, (4) constitutional congruence, and 
(5) non-substantive constitutional features. (The last two of these apply 
only at the state level since there is only one federal Constitution, and so 
no federal constitutional variation.) 
Perhaps our most surprising finding, in light of Justice Kennedy’s (and 
others’) predictions, is that how closely a constitution corresponds to a 
 
 
 6. See infra Part III (providing descriptive exploration of constitutional approval). 
 7. See infra Part IV (providing explanatory analysis of constitutional approval). 
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respondent’s preferences essentially has no impact on her approval of the 
document. Congruence fails to rise to statistical significance in any of our 
models, and varying it from its minimum to its maximum barely budges 
support. Our results for non-substantive constitutional features are equally 
unimpressive. Our respondents appear entirely unmoved by their charters’ 
age, length, and amendment frequency. 
The demographic story is somewhat more complicated. Gender, 
education, income, and most racial categories either fail to attain 
significance, or have small and inconsistent effects on approval. But older 
respondents reliably rate their constitutions more favorably than their 
younger peers. And unique among racial groups, African Americans 
consistently are less constitutionally satisfied, even controlling for other 
demographic and socioeconomic factors. America’s familiar black-white 
cleavage thus extends to people’s sentiments toward their charters. 
A clearer picture emerges for civic knowledge and institutional 
attitudes. At both the federal and state levels, respondents who are more 
familiar with their constitutions, and who follow current events more 
closely, are more supportive of the documents. Similarly, at both levels, 
respondents who are prouder of where they live are stauncher 
constitutional advocates. In fact, the results for constitutional knowledge 
and jurisdictional pride are the most robust generated by our models. As 
these variables go from their minimums to their maximums, about a three-
point spike in approval ensues (on a ten-point scale). 
The most important implication of our findings is that constitutional 
support cannot be won through constitutional refinement. Since neither 
charters’ substantive content nor their non-substantive features influence 
approval, constitutional design is effectively useless as a tool for 
increasing public backing for the document. This is a sobering truth for 
constitutional drafters, many of whom hope that their handiworks will 
reshape society in fundamental ways. Constitutions may have all kinds of 
consequences, but contra Justice Kennedy, earning the people’s “high 
respect” and “veneration” is not one of them.8 
Another insight from our analysis is more sanguine. Leaders who want 
their constituents to back their constitution are not powerless to bring 
about this outcome. But the right strategy is not to tweak the document to 
make it more attractive, but rather to boost people’s familiarity with it and 
to swell their pride in their state or country. How can this be done? This is 
not the place for detailed prescriptions, but civic education, in the form of 
 
 
 8. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578. 
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classes, marketing campaigns, and the like, is an intuitive way to inform 
the public. These techniques may also foster civic pride, but here the 
sounder option may be actually to compile a record worth being proud of. 
A well-run jurisdiction is its own reward—and if it results in higher 
constitutional approval, so much the better. 
Our findings confirm in some respects, but challenge in others, several 
distinct literatures.
9
 The first is normative constitutional theory, several of 
whose leading lights contend that popular support for the constitution is 
necessary for the document to achieve legitimacy, compliance, durability, 
and binding legal status. These scholars should celebrate our results, 
which show that constitutional backing is high and so imply that key 
constitutional values indeed are being realized. But these observers may be 
taken aback by our conclusion that constitutional approval is unrelated to 
constitutional content, which contradicts their widely held view that 
charters must be just in order to be popularly accepted. 
The second literature, sounding more in political science than in law, 
examines the reasons for other institutions’ approval (especially the 
Supreme Court and Congress). For the most part, it holds that knowledge 
and congruence are crucial factors while demography is not. We arrive at 
similar judgments as to knowledge and demography in the constitutional 
context. But to reiterate, however relevant it may be in other areas that 
policies correspond to people’s preferences, it is immaterial to support in 
ours.  
The third area is the study of comparative constitutional design. 
Historically, it has focused on the impact of different drafting choices on 
outcomes such as compliance, durability, growth, and yes, public backing. 
More recently, though, attention has shifted from constitutional substance 
to the process of constitutional ratification. Our results throw cold water 
on the notion that public opinion toward the constitution can be influenced 
by what the document says. But they dovetail nicely with the growing 
emphasis on ratification procedure. If people are more involved in the 
constitution’s drafting and entry into law, they also may become more 
familiar with it and prouder of their own pivotal role. And these factors, 
again, are the primary drivers of constitutional approval. 
The fourth and final literature is the sociological analysis of 
nationalism and its consequences. These consequences are usually thought 
to be mixed—positive when nationalism takes the form of patriotism, but 
negative when it transmutes into an assertion of national superiority. Our 
 
 
 9. See infra Part V (discussing implications of findings). 
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result that jurisdictional pride boosts support for the constitution reveals 
another favorable aspect of patriotism, one that has not been documented 
by any studies to date.  
The Article unfolds as follows. In Part I, we discuss the existing work 
on the causes and consequences of constitutional approval. While there is 
ample theoretical scholarship, the available empirics deal almost 
exclusively with other institutions. Next, in Part II, we explain our 
methodology. We describe the nationwide survey we conducted as well as 
our coding of state constitutions. Parts III and IV then form the Article’s 
analytical core. Part III offers a descriptive account of constitutional 
backing, while Part IV constructs our federal and state regression models. 
Lastly, in Part V, we comment on the implications of our findings. We 
address how they relate to other literatures, what policy reforms they 
entail, and how they could be bolstered by further research. 
One more introductory point: Because this is the first study to assess 
constitutional support empirically, our analysis is necessarily provisional. 
We are sure there are ways to refine our measurements of both support and 
its potential causes. It also is possible our conclusions would change if we 
examined different time periods or countries. Nevertheless, we think there 
is substantial value to this project. A subject of great qualitative interest 
now—finally—has been opened to quantitative exploration. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Constitutional approval is not a self-explanatory concept. It is not 
obvious, at first glance, what it is, why it matters, or what produces it. So, 
in this Part, we comment briefly on the meaning, the consequences, and 
the causes of public support for the Constitution. We draw first from 
theoretical literatures in law and social science, and then from recent 
empirical work on the approval of other governmental institutions.  
A. Theory 
1. Meaning 
Half a century ago, David Easton distinguished between two kinds of 
political support that people may give.
10
 The first, specific support, refers 
to “the satisfactions that members of a system feel they obtain from the . . . 
 
 
 10. See DAVID EASTON, A SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE 273 (1965); David Easton, A 
Re-Assessment of the Concept of Popular Support, 5 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 435, 437, 444 (1975). 
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outputs and performance of the political authorities.”11 It refers, that is, to 
people’s approval of an institution’s actual policies and operation. The 
second, diffuse support, “consists of a ‘reservoir of favorable attitudes or 
good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they 
are opposed.’”12 It is people’s willingness to comply with policies they 
dislike due to faith in the body promulgating the policies. It is essentially a 
synonym for institutional legitimacy. 
Easton’s framework is ubiquitous in the scholarship on public 
attitudes toward the branches of government.
13
 And under it, there is no 
doubt that our variable of interest, constitutional approval, is closer to 
specific support than to diffuse support.
14
 When people are asked how 
strongly they approve of their constitution, they are prompted to consider 
and then to rate their current views of the document. They are not induced 
to reflect on whether they still would adhere to its commands if they 
thought them unjust, or whether they would like to scrap it and start 
afresh. Constitutional approval, like equivalent questions about judicial, 
legislative, and executive branch approval, thus taps people’s opinions on 
constitutional performance. It does not capture their feelings on 
constitutional legitimacy.
15
 
So defined, as a measure of specific support for the constitution, why 
does constitutional approval matter? One possibility is that it is an intrinsic 
good, a value that is desirable for its own sake. Perhaps, in a constitutional 
democracy, we simply think that people should deem their charter worthy 
of respect and admiration. This is the position that Sandy Levinson takes 
in his classic work on “constitutional faith,” a concept that straddles the 
 
 
 11. Easton, supra note 10, at 437. 
 12. Id. at 444 (quoting EASTON, supra note 10, at 273). 
 13. See, e.g., GERHARD LOEWENBERG & SAMUEL C. PATTERSON, COMPARING LEGISLATURES 
285–86 (1979); Barry Friedman, Mediated Popular Constitutionalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2596, 2614 
(2003) (noting that Easton’s framework has been used “[f]or at least the last forty years”); James L. 
Gibson et al., Measuring Attitudes Toward the United States Supreme Court, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 354, 
356 (2003); Marc J. Hetherington, The Political Relevance of Political Trust, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
791, 792 (1998). 
 14. We say closer, rather than identical, to specific support because we can imagine survey 
questions that tap specific support even more directly. For example, “How much do you approve of the 
specific provisions in your state’s constitution?” or “How satisfied are you with the performance of 
your state’s constitution?” 
 15. See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 638, 642 (1992) (arguing, in a study of support for the Supreme Court, 
that specific support is best captured by “whether the subject is satisfied or dissatisfied with the 
outputs of the institution,” while diffuse support is best captured by “tough questions about [people’s] 
willingness to accept, make, or countenance major changes in . . . how the high bench functions”); 
James L. Gibson et al., On the Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 348 
(1998) (same).  
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line between specific and diffuse support.
16
 “Is not the central question,” 
Levinson asks, “whether, after reflection, we can genuinely . . . declare 
and celebrate our status as Americans ‘attached to the principles of the 
Constitution’?”17 
Well, it may or may not be the central question. For one thing, as 
Levinson himself recognizes, too much constitutional approval may not be 
a good thing.
18
 It may signify that people are ignorant of the document’s 
shortcomings, unaware of its obsolete provisions, ethical compromises, 
and flawed notions of governance. For another, excessive approval may 
cause people to become too wedded to the constitution as it currently 
stands, too resistant to proposals to amend or replace it. Love that makes 
us blind is not love we should applaud. 
2.  Consequences 
Furthermore, support for the constitution may matter less for its own 
sake, and more because it gives rise to other deeply important values. 
Chief among these is constitutional legitimacy—or, in Easton’s terms, 
diffuse support for the constitution. On at least two memorable occasions, 
Supreme Court Justices have argued that this is precisely why public 
approval of the Court’s decisions is essential; without it, the Court’s 
legitimacy would be severely undermined. In Baker v. Carr, the 1962 case 
that launched the reapportionment revolution, Justice Frankfurter asserted 
that “[t]he Court’s authority—possessed of neither the purse nor the 
sword—ultimately rests on sustained public confidence in its moral 
sanction.”19 He worried (needlessly, it turns out) that the public would 
oppose the Court’s foray into the “political thicket,”20 thus tarnishing the 
Court’s reputation.  
 
 
 16. See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988); Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith 
in the Civil Religion; or, Would You Sign the Constitution?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113 (1987). 
 17. Levinson, supra note 16, at 116 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1982)); see also JACK M. 
BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 105 (2011) 
(“Within our legal culture the idea of fidelity to the Constitution is seen as pretty much an 
unquestioned good.”). Levinson used to have a complicated kind of constitutional faith, but he now 
has rejected the federal Constitution as fundamentally undemocratic. See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR 
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE 
PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2006). 
 18. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. 
 19. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 20. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (plurality opinion). Frankfurter’s worry was 
needless because the one person, one vote principle that the Court announced quickly won wide 
acceptance. The Court’s intervention thus did not diminish but rather enhanced its legitimacy. 
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p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
122 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:113 
 
 
 
 
Likewise, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case that 
entrenched Roe v. Wade as the law of the land, Justices O’Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter declared that the Court’s “legitimacy” is a “product 
of . . . the people’s acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the 
Nation’s law means.”21 The Justices feared that if the Court reversed Roe 
“under fire” from Roe’s critics, a “loss of confidence” would follow that 
the Court makes its decisions based on law rather than “political 
pressure.”22 This loss of confidence, in turn, “would subvert the Court’s 
legitimacy beyond any serious question.”23 The Court’s authority would 
fall in tandem with its public support. 
The Justices, though, are not the only ones to have speculated about a 
link between approval and legitimacy. So too have scholars in 
constitutional law, legal philosophy, and political science. In constitutional 
law, Jack Balkin, Richard Fallon, Frederick Schauer, and David Strauss all 
have contended that the Constitution’s legitimacy stems from its 
continuing endorsement by the public.
24
 As Fallon has put it, “The 
Constitution is law not because it was lawfully ratified . . . but because it is 
accepted as authoritative.”25  
In legal philosophy, similarly, positivists like H.L.A. Hart and Brian 
Leiter have asserted that a norm counts as law if there is “general 
acceptance of or acquiescence in” its legally binding status.26 Under this 
approach, the social fact that a constitution is widely supported makes it 
 
 
 21. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992) (joint opinion). 
 22. Id. at 867. 
 23. Id.; see also id. at 868 (noting that, for elected branches, “diminished legitimacy may be 
restored . . . . [by] a new mandate from the voters”). 
 24. See Jack M. Balkin, The Distribution of Political Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 1144, 1145 (2012); 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1803–06 (2005); 
Frederick Schauer, Precedent and the Necessary Externality of Constitutional Norms, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 45, 52 (1994) (arguing that “ultimate validity . . . of the Constitution” comes from “the 
raw empirical fact of political acceptance”); David A. Strauss, Reply: Legitimacy and Obedience, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1861 (2005) (“[T]he Constitution owes its legitimacy to the fact of general 
popular acceptance . . . .”). Legal scholars have also suggested that constitutional approval is a proxy 
for constitutional success. See Helene Landemore, What Is a Good Constitution? Assessing the Crowd-
Sourced Constitutional Proposal in the Icelandic Experiment, in ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL 
PERFORMANCE 71, 79 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds., 2016 forthcoming) (“A great constitution 
would thus be one that is beautifully written and likely to generate emotions such as love and 
admiration among its own people and beyond, among current and future generations.”). 
 25. Fallon, supra note 24, at 1805. 
 26. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 108 (2d ed. 1994); see also, e.g., Leslie Green, 
Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1035, 1039 (2008) (“[L]aw 
must be grounded in social facts . . . .”); Brian Leiter, Postivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1138, 1141 (1999) (reviewing ANTHONY SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN 
JURISPRUDENCE (1998)) (“What counts as law in any particular society is fundamentally a matter of 
social fact.”). 
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more likely that its provisions are treated as compulsory by the public. 
And in political science, Gregory Caldeira, James Gibson, and others have 
theorized that courts’ diffuse support is tied to their specific support.27 The 
concepts are not perfectly correlated—indeed, Easton’s contribution was 
to tease them apart—but “[o]ver the long-term, the two types of support 
should be related (and may converge).”28 
A second value to which constitutional approval may be connected is 
constitutional compliance. When people mostly back their charters, they 
may be more prone to obey them, and to insist that their governments 
abide by them too. In previous work, one of us has documented the 
startling degree of noncompliance that characterizes many countries’ 
constitutions.
29
 Finding ways to improve enforcement is thus a priority—
and an intuitive means to this end is persuading people to support their 
constitutions more strongly. Randy Barnett has made the point nicely: 
“[S]ome form of general acquiescence is necessary for any constitution to 
be implemented . . . .”30 Analogously, in his work on “rights revolutions” 
that induce governments to respect constitutional rights, Charles Epp has 
suggested that they are most likely to succeed if there exists a “broad 
support structure in civil society.”31 This support structure, in turn, arises 
due to widespread public backing for the constitution.
32
 
Third, constitutional approval could lessen the countermajoritarian 
difficulty: the worry that courts are behaving undemocratically when they 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme 
Court: Models of Diffuse Support, 54 J. POL. 1120, 1127 (1992); Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 344 
(referring to “the conventional (U.S.) hypothes[is] that . . . specific and diffuse support are connected, 
but not too strongly”); Dean Jaros & Robert Roper, The U.S. Supreme Court: Myth, Diffuse Support, 
Specific Support, and Legitimacy, 8 AM. POL. Q. 85, 87 (1980).  
 28. Gibson et al., supra note 13, at 356.  
 29. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863, 897–912 
(2013). 
 30. Randy E. Barnett, Constitutional Legitimacy, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 125 (2003). 
 31. See CHARLES R. EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS, AND SUPREME 
COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 5 (1998) (also suggesting that a “rights revolution” requires 
“a significant degree of organized collective action,” as well as “financing, organizational support, and 
willing and able lawyers”); see also BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC POLITICS 125–55 (2009) (finding that human rights conventions 
enjoy greater compliance when they are backed by political activists and civil society groups); Eric 
Neumayer, Do International Human Rights Treaties Improve Respect for Human Rights?, 49 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 925, 950 (2005) (“[Human rights treaties’] ratification is more beneficial the 
stronger a country’s civil society, that is, the more its citizens participate in international NGOs.”); 
Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 245, 251–52 (1997) (suggesting that in order for people to mobilize to enforce a constitution, 
they need to approve of it sufficiently). 
 32. See EPP, supra note 31, at 5. 
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strike down popularly enacted laws.
33
 This worry is exacerbated when a 
constitution is disliked by the public; then courts not only nullify 
legislation that navigated the usual democratic channels, but do so in the 
name of a document whose standing is open to doubt. In contrast, if a 
constitution is broadly supported, then aggressive judicial activity on its 
behalf may be less troublesome. Then the activity may seem like the 
realization of the people’s deepest public values, not their frustration.34 A 
claim of this kind is at the heart of Bruce Ackerman’s prominent theory of 
“constitutional moments.”35 The reason why these moments deserve to be 
judicially enforced is that they, not ordinary legislation, boast the closer 
connection to the people’s true aspirations for their society. 
Lastly, constitutional approval may promote constitutional durability. 
A popular constitution may be more likely to stand the test of time, to 
resist successfully efforts to replace it with another charter. This durability 
argument dates back to Madison, who remarked in The Federalist that, 
without “veneration” for the Constitution, “perhaps the wisest and freest 
governments would not possess the requisite stability.”36 It also has been 
advanced by contemporary scholars like Rosalind Dixon and Tom 
Ginsburg, who have speculated that “[t]he lower the level of popular 
support for a constitution, the more vulnerable a constitution will . . . be to 
whole-scale replacement.”37 It is worth noting, though, that constitutional 
longevity is not an unalloyed good. Madison’s great rival and friend, 
Jefferson, famously argued that the dead should not govern the living, and 
thus that no constitution should survive for more than a generation.
38
  
 
 
 33. See generally Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002) (final chapter of an elaborate 
five-part series on the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
 34. See Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 VA. L. 
REV. 389, 417 (1998) (describing Alexander Bickel’s position that “the legitimacy of judicial review 
derived from the eventual congruence of the judicial decision with the views of the citizens”). 
 35. This theory has been developed in several installments, the most recent of which is found in 3 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2014). 
 36. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 37. Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Deciding Not to Decide: Deferral in Constitutional 
Design, 9 INT’L J. CONST. L. 636, 645 (2011); see also, e.g., Troy E. Smith, Divided Publius: 
Democracy, Federalism, and the Cultivation of Public Sentiment, 69 REV. POL. 568, 571 (2007) (“[A]n 
enduring system also require[s] cultivating and maintaining favorable public sentiment for the 
Constitution’s institutions and checks on power.”). 
 38. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 15 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392, 396 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1958) [hereinafter Jefferson Letter] (stating 
that “the earth belongs in usufruct to the living” and that “[e]very constitution then, and every law, 
naturally expires at the end of 19 years”). Interestingly, the actual durability of countries’ and U.S. 
states’ constitutions corresponds almost perfectly to the Jeffersonian model. See ZACHARY ELKINS ET 
AL., THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 129 (2009) (reporting that the “median survival 
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To be clear, these are all hypotheses, not statements of fact. 
Constitutional approval may bring about greater legitimacy, compliance, 
longevity, and so on—or it may not. Later in this Part,39 we survey the 
(quite limited) empirical evidence on its consequences. But for now, our 
point is only that many scholars believe, rightly or wrongly, that it yields 
significant benefits. This is enough, in our view, to justify our present 
examination. Next, we turn from the consequences of constitutional 
approval to the causes. They matter too because, depending on which are 
correct, very different prescriptions may follow for constitutional 
designers and governmental leaders.  
3. Causes 
First, people’s demographic attributes may affect their support for the 
constitution. People who have prospered under its regime—whites, men, 
the wealthy, the well-educated—may back it more strongly than their less 
fortunate peers. Conversely, the disadvantaged may be more loyal to the 
constitution if they believe that it espouses a message of dignity and 
equality. In the words of Christine Kelleher and Jennifer Wolak, “It is . . . 
possible that confidence in state institutions is driven more by individual 
demographic differences than contextual differences in state 
institutions.”40 
Second, constitutional approval may stem from constitutional 
knowledge. Those who are more informed about the constitution may be 
“exposed to a series of legitimizing messages focused on the symbols of 
justice,” thus increasing their affection for it.41 Maybe “to know it is to 
love it,” in the pithy phrase of Caldeira and Gibson.42 Or maybe not. 
Perhaps those who are more educated about the constitution also are more 
conscious of its deficiencies, of the ways it has failed to fulfill its 
promises. Then familiarity may breed contempt, not admiration. 
Third, constitutional approval may reflect people’s attitudes toward 
other institutions. For instance, those who are prouder of their state or 
 
 
time” of a constitution is nineteen years); Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional 
Exceptionalism Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1671 (2014). 
 39. See infra Part I.B. 
 40. Christine A. Kelleher & Jennifer Wolak, Explaining Public Confidence in the Branches of 
State Government, 60 POL. RES. Q. 707, 711 (2007). 
 41. Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 345 (discussing courts rather than constitutions). 
 42. James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Knowing the Supreme Court? A Reconsideration of 
Public Ignorance of the High Court, 71 J. POL. 429, 436–37 (2009) (also referring to courts rather than 
constitutions). 
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country also may be more attached to the constitution that structures its 
public affairs. Analogously, if a particular party emphasizes devotion to 
the constitution, this party’s members may profess higher levels of 
constitutional support. “[C]itizens’ basic affect toward governmental 
institutions will extend to their evaluations of the [constitution],” 
according to Robert Durr, Andrew Martin, and Christina Wolbrecht.
43
 
Fourth, people may support the constitution because its substantive 
content corresponds to their preferences. People may hold opinions as to 
which provisions should be included in (and excluded from) the 
constitution, and they may back it to the extent it is congruent with their 
views. Balkin has made this argument succinctly (if disapprovingly). 
“Many people may be reasonably comfortable with the status quo . . . . For 
such people, constitutional faith is not particularly difficult . . . .”44 Their 
approval flows from their constitutional contentment. 
And fifth, people may favor the constitution because of its key non-
substantive features—its age, length, amendment frequency, ratification 
process, and so on. In Madison’s view, “veneration” is a property that 
“time bestows on every thing;”45 constitutional approval, that is, arises 
from constitutional longevity. Similarly, Ginsburg and his coauthors have 
noted the common “claim that participatory design processes,” in which 
people are involved in charters’ drafting and approval, “generate 
constitutions with higher levels of . . . popular support.”46 Furthermore, 
people may prefer a longer constitution because it is able to address more 
issues they care about in greater detail.
47
 Or their taste may run to a more 
easily amendable charter because it can adapt more readily to changing 
societal circumstances.
48
 
Once again, these are only hypotheses. Below, we summarize the 
existing empirical work on why people approve of constitutions and other 
governmental institutions. It also is true that many more explanations for 
 
 
 43. Robert H. Durr et al., Ideological Divergence and Public Support for the Supreme Court, 44 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 768, 772 (2000) (referring to the Supreme Court). 
 44. Balkin, supra note 24, at 1145; see also Sanford Levinson, How I Lost My Constitutional 
Faith, 71 MD. L. REV. 956, 962 (2012) (arguing that constitutional “love” is tied to whether “one 
benefits mightily from the status quo it tends to entrench”). 
 45. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 46. Tom Ginsburg et al., Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?, 5 ANN. REV. L. & 
SOC. SCI. 201, 215 (2009) (also noting that this claim has been “subject to only limited study”). 
 47. See Mila Versteeg, Unpopular Constitutionalism, 89 IND. L.J. 1133, 1169 (2014) (finding 
that constitutions containing more rights are more congruent with public opinion). 
 48. See Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Un-Entrenched: Towards an Alternative 
Theory of Constitutional Design, 110 AM. POL. SCI. REV (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=2780494 (describing constitutional flexibility as deliberate design strategy for constitutional 
drafters that want to maximize popular control over government). 
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constitutional support could be posited: judicial decisions, economic 
trends, elite opinions, mass polarization, etc. But we are confident we have 
identified the main causal claims in the theoretical literature (and the ones 
most relevant to constitutions specifically rather than institutions 
generally).
49
 These claims therefore occupy much of our attention in the 
rest of the Article. 
B. Empirics 
Unfortunately, almost nothing is known about the specific subject of 
constitutional approval. Major American surveys (such as the American 
National Election Studies, the General Social Survey, and the National 
Annenberg Election Survey) do not ask about it.
50
 Nor do most important 
foreign surveys (such as the Eurobarometer, the Latinobarómeter, and the 
World Values Survey). In fact, the only poll we have found that 
(sometimes) includes a germane question is the Afrobarometer. In three of 
its five rounds, it asked respondents whether they agree or disagree with 
the statement, “Our constitution expresses the values and hopes of the 
[country’s] people.”51 As far as we can tell, only one academic paper, by 
Devra Moehler and Staffan Lindberg, has taken advantage of the resulting 
data.
52
 Moehler also has surveyed Ugandans on whether they support their 
most recent constitution.
53
 
Fortunately, this is not the end of the story. Many American polls 
routinely ask people about their approval of other governmental 
institutions: the Supreme Court, Congress, the President, state 
governments, and so on. Many scholars also rigorously investigate the 
consequences and causes of approval of these bodies. Their findings are 
 
 
 49. Cf. JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS: 
POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 43 (2009) (arriving at a similar 
list of “important sources of support” for Supreme Court after scanning “[e]arlier research”).  
 50. A 2011 survey by Time Magazine has enquired whether people support a new constitutional 
convention. See William D. Blake & Sanford V. Levinson, The Limits of Veneration: Public Support 
for a New Constitutional Convention 16–24 (Oct. 2, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2668891 (analyzing the survey data and exploring the predictors of support 
for a new constitutional convention). 
 51. The Afrobarometer codebooks are available online. Archive of Survey Results, 
AFROBAROMETER, http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/merged-data (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). It was 
the first three of the Afrobarometer’s rounds that asked this question. The first round and portions of 
the second round used “aspirations” instead of “hopes.” 
 52. See Devra C. Moehler & Staffan I. Lindberg, Narrowing the Legitimacy Gap: Turnovers as a 
Cause of Democratic Consolidation, 71 J. POL. 1448, 1453 (2009).  
 53. See Devra C. Moehler, Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda, 44 J. MOD. 
AFR. STUD. 275, 284–86 (2006).  
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not directly applicable to this project, so we do not dwell on them at great 
length. But they do illuminate many of the factors that might be linked to 
constitutional approval, thus setting the stage for our own examination. 
Beginning with the consequences of institutional approval, only one of 
them, institutional legitimacy, has been assessed empirically. Most of the 
relevant work has concluded that specific support for courts is a 
statistically significant predictor of diffuse support for them.
54
 A 
noteworthy study by Vanessa Baird, Caldeira, and Gibson, for instance, 
found that specific support is related to diffuse support for the national 
high court in nineteen out of twenty countries (Russia being the lone 
exception).
55
 Similarly, the most recent article on the topic, by Gibson and 
Michael Nelson, showed that performance satisfaction is tied to 
institutional support for the U.S. Supreme Court even controlling for a 
host of other variables.
56
 These results validate the predictions of Easton’s 
theoretical model. As the model anticipates, diffuse support arises—in part 
but not exclusively—from specific support.57 
Turning to the causes of institutional approval, people’s demographic 
attributes, first, are not especially influential. Moehler found that support 
for the Ugandan constitution does not vary significantly by respondents’ 
gender, age, education, or wealth.
58
 Caldeira and Gibson detected only 
“[t]rivial bivariate correlations . . . between Court attitudes and gender and 
age,” though African Americans are less likely to back the Court.59 
According to David Jones and Monika McDermott, “definitive evidence 
remains elusive” as to “whether or not socioeconomic status affects public 
approval of Congress.”60 And the coefficients for gender, age, and 
 
 
 54. In addition to the studies cited below, see GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 49, at 43 (“[A] 
relationship between approval of performance and policy outputs (specific support) and institutional 
loyalty is typically found in research on public attitudes.”); Lori Hausegger & Troy Riddell, The 
Changing Nature of Public Support for the Supreme Court of Canada, 37 CAN. J. POL. SCI. 23, 25 
(2004) (“Several studies have discovered a strong relationship between respondents’ evaluations of 
particular decisions or policies of the Court and their general attitudes towards the Court itself.”); and 
John M. Scheb II & William Lyons, Diffuse Support, Specific Support and Attentiveness: Components 
of the Public’s Assessment of the Supreme Court, 27 SE. POL. REV. 765, 770 tbl.2 (1999). 
 55. See Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 351–52. 
 56. See James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy 
Grounded in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162, 169 (2015). 
 57. For earlier studies finding only a weak connection between specific and diffuse support, see 
Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 15, at 651 (analyzing mass public); Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 27, 
at 1131 (analyzing blacks); and Jaros & Roper, supra note 27, at 103 (analyzing college students).  
 58. See Moehler, supra note 53, at 290 tbl.1. 
 59. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 49, at 58–60. 
 60. David R. Jones & Monika L. McDermott, Ideological Distance from the Majority Party and 
Public Approval of Congress, 27 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 245, 247 (2002); see also id. at 254 tbl.1 (also 
finding no effect of income on congressional approval); Jeffery J. Mondak et al., Does Familiarity 
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education are insignificant in most of Kelleher and Wolak’s models of 
state governmental approval, though blacks again are less supportive of all 
three branches.
61
 At least in this area, demography does not seem to be 
destiny (except possibly for African Americans).  
 Second, the impact of knowledge about the institution varies by the 
body at issue. As to the Court, Caldeira, Gibson, and others have found 
consistently that people who are more informed about it also support it 
more strongly.
62
 “[A] considerable body of earlier research” establishes 
that “as knowledge of the Supreme Court increases, so too does loyalty 
toward the institution.”63 But as to Congress, knowledge is related 
negatively to approval. John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse,
64
 Jones 
and McDermott,
65
 and Jeffery Mondak and his coauthors,
66
 all have 
determined that “Americans who know Congress the best like it the 
least.”67 (Though Mondak and his coauthors have explained that this may 
be because high-knowledge and low-knowledge people assess Congress 
differently, not because knowledge directly affects approval.
68
) 
Third, people’s attitudes toward other institutions, and toward 
government generally, usually influence their opinion of any particular 
institution. Ugandans who support their country’s ruling party tend to back 
their constitution.
69
 Americans who think government takes their views 
 
 
Breed Contempt? The Impact of Information on Mass Attitudes Toward Congress, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
34, 41 tbl.4 (2007) (finding no effect of gender or education, but negative effect of age, on 
congressional approval); Samuel C. Patterson et al., Citizens’ Orientations Toward Legislatures: 
Congress and the State Legislature, 45 W. POL. Q. 315, 324 tbl.2 (1992) (finding no effect of 
education, income, or race on congressional or state legislative approval).  
 61. See Kelleher & Wolak, supra note 40, at 714 tbl.2, 716 tbl.3, 717 tbl.4; see also John R. 
Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Process Preferences and American Politics: What the People 
Want Government to Be, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 145, 150, 151 tbl.1 (2001) (finding that no 
demographic attributes significantly influence overall governmental approval). 
 62. See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 49, at 53 (referring primarily to diffuse support); 
Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 42, at 438 (same); Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 352 (same); Gibson 
& Nelson, supra note 56, at 169 (same). 
 63. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 49, at 53; see also Moehler, supra note 53, at 290 tbl.1 
(finding a link between Ugandan constitutional approval and following public affairs, but no link for 
exposure to news on radio, exposure to newspapers, or exposure to news meetings). 
 64. See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC 
ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995); JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH 
THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD 
WORK (2002). 
 65. See Jones & McDermott, supra note 60, at 254 tbl.1 (finding that interest in politics 
negatively affects congressional approval).  
 66. See Mondak et al., supra note 60, at 41–42.  
 67. Id. at 34.  
 68. See id. at 42–47 (showing that high-knowledge people assess Congress based on policy 
congruence while low-knowledge people’s evaluations are driven by their views of the President). 
 69. See Moehler, supra note 53, at 291 tbl.1. 
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into account, and who adhere to broad democratic values, approve of the 
Court at higher rates.
70
 And respondents who trust government to do the 
right thing are more likely to evaluate Congress’s performance 
positively.
71
 However, the evidence is mixed as to whether support for one 
governmental branch is linked to support for the other branches. Some 
studies find that it is,
72
 while others conclude to the contrary.
73
 
Fourth, the literature is nearly unanimous that people approve more 
strongly of bodies whose policy outputs are more congruent with their 
preferences. As to the Court, Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht found that the 
more its decisions diverge ideologically from the public’s views, the less 
the public supports it.
74
 Likewise, Brandon Bartels and Christopher 
Johnston showed that respondents’ ideological disagreement with the 
Court is linked to reduced backing for it.
75
 And as to Congress, Jones and 
McDermott,
76
 Mondak and his coauthors,
77
 and Mark Ramirez
78
 
determined that its approval declines, respectively, as respondents’ 
ideological distance from the majority party grows, as people perceive that 
their views are worse represented, and as it deviates further from the 
public mood. This connection between approval and policy congruence is 
the closest this body of scholarship comes to a consensus. 
And fifth, relatively little is known about what we earlier called the 
non-substantive features of institutions. In her Ugandan study, Moehler 
 
 
 70. See GIBSON & CALDEIRA, supra note 49, at 59–60 (referring primarily to diffuse support); 
Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 42, at 438 (same); Gibson & Nelson, supra note 56, at 169 (same); 
Marc J. Hetherington & Joseph L. Smith, Issue Preferences and Evaluations of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 71 PUB. OPINION Q. 40, 56 tbl.3 (2007) (same). 
 71. See Virginia A. Chanley et al., The Origins and Consequences of Public Trust in 
Government: A Time Series Analysis, 64 PUB. OPINION Q. 239, 250 tbl.2 (2000) (but also finding that 
trust in government is unrelated to presidential approval); Patterson et al., supra note 60, at 324 tbl.2; 
Mark D. Ramirez, The Policy Origins of Congressional Approval, 75 J. POL. 198, 204 tbl.2 (2013).  
 72. See, e.g., Jones & McDermott, supra note 60, at 255 tbl.1 (finding a link between presidential 
and congressional approval); Matthew J. Lebo, Divided Government, United Approval: The Dynamics 
of Congressional and Presidential Approval, 35 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 1, 10 tbl.2, 12 tbl.3 (2008) 
(same); Mondak et al., supra note 60, at 41 tbl.4 (same).  
 73. See, e.g., Chanley et al., supra note 71, at 250 tbl.2 (finding no link between presidential and 
congressional approval); Durr et al., supra note 43, at 773 (finding that presidential and congressional 
approval are unrelated to Court approval); Patterson et al., supra note 60, at 324 tbl.2 (finding no link 
between executive and legislative approval).  
 74. See Durr et al., supra note 43, at 773. 
 75. See Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of 
Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184, 192 (2013); see also 
Gibson & Nelson, supra note 56, at 165 (pointing out that while Bartels and Johnston claim they are 
studying Supreme Court legitimacy, “the measure used . . . is contaminated with specific support 
variance”).  
 76. See Jones & McDermott, supra note 60, at 254 tbl.1, 258.  
 77. See Mondak et al., supra note 60, at 41 tbl.4.  
 78. See Ramirez, supra note 71, at 204 tbl.2.  
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found that more extensive participation in the process of constitutional 
ratification did not result in greater backing for the document.
79
 In their 
analysis of national high courts, Baird, Caldeira, and Gibson showed that 
“[t]here is a very strong relationship . . . between the age of the court and 
the level of satisfaction with its outputs.”80 And in their work on American 
state governments, Kelleher and Wolak determined that legislative 
professionalism and the voter initiative reduce legislative support while 
term limits increase it, that the gubernatorial recall has no effect on 
gubernatorial support, and that the type of judicial election is unrelated to 
judicial support.
81
  
Much more could be said about the literature on institutional approval, 
which is impressively rich and varied. But for present purposes, there are 
two essential points. First, the literature barely addresses constitutional 
approval—and overlooks U.S. constitutions entirely. Our poll is the very 
first to ask Americans how strongly they back their state and federal 
charters. And second, the literature does suggest an array of consequences 
and causes of constitutional approval. The potentially significant 
consequences are why we think support for the constitution is worth 
studying, while the hypothesized causes guide much of our analysis of the 
concept. It is to this analysis that we now turn. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
Our main tool for exploring whether and why people back their 
constitutions is a nationally representative survey that we carried out in 
October 2014. The survey asked Americans about their support for their 
federal and state charters, as well as a host of other issues that might 
influence approval levels. The survey also focused on state constitutions 
because their considerable variation makes them an ideal laboratory for 
studying the impact of constitutional design. While there is only one 
federal Constitution, state constitutions diverge widely in their substantive 
content, in their non-substantive features, and in the populations they aim 
to govern. They thus enable us to test many more hypotheses about 
constitutional approval than does the federal Constitution alone. 
Another advantage of our emphasis on state constitutions is that our 
results for them may be more generalizable to constitutions around the 
globe. It is true that subnational constitutions tend to be more obscure than 
 
 
 79. See Moehler, supra note 53, at 290 tbl.1.  
 80. See Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 355.  
 81. See Kelleher & Wolak, supra note 40, at 714 tbl.2, 716 tbl.3. 
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their national counterparts,
82
 and that they do not need to address certain 
issues covered by the higher-level charters.
83
 However, as one of us has 
recently shown, American state constitutions actually are more similar to 
foreign countries’ constitutions than is the U.S. federal Constitution.84 
Like most foreign constitutions, state charters tend to be long and detailed, 
to grant plenary rather than limited powers, to be amended or replaced 
frequently, and to be fairly unfamiliar to their publics.
85
 Judged by these 
characteristics, it is the U.S. federal Constitution that is the true outlier on 
the international stage.
86
 So while we study its backing as well, it is our 
state-level findings that may be more applicable to constitutions 
worldwide. 
A. Survey Design  
To determine the levels and causes of constitutional approval, we 
designed and then administered a nationally representative online survey.
87
 
The survey was conducted by Survey Sampling International (SSI), a firm 
that specializes in online polling research. SSI distributed our survey to a 
panel of respondents that was nationally representative in terms of gender, 
age, race/ethnicity, and census region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and 
West).
88
 To build the panel, SSI used relationships with partnership 
organizations through which respondents had agreed to participate in 
online polls. For example, some respondents signed up through United 
Airlines, and were rewarded with frequent flyer miles. Others signed up 
 
 
 82. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 2 n.4 (1998) (reporting a 1991 
survey finding that “52 percent of respondents knew that their state had its own constitution, 11 
percent believed that it did not, and 37 percent did not know or gave no answer”). 
 83. See Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1585–86 
(2010) (arguing that drafters of subnational constitutions are less concerned with reducing agency 
costs, resulting in “weaker government structures . . . , weaker rights, or lower[] hurdles to 
amendment”).  
 84. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 38, at 1652 (“[W]hen state constitutions are included in 
characterizations of American constitutionalism, it becomes clear that Americans have participated in 
forms of constitutional politics that look very similar to those in the rest of the world.”). 
 85. See id. at 1652–99; see also STEPHEN BROOKS, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM IN THE AGE OF 
OBAMA 93 (2013) (citing survey research that Canadians are more familiar with the American 
constitution than with their own). 
 86. See David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States 
Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762 (2012). 
 87. The survey was approved by the Institutional Review Board of the University of Virginia.  
 88. The distribution of respondents was as follows: (1) Gender: Male: 48.3%; Female: 51.7%; 
(2) Age: 18–24: 13.1%; 25–34: 17.5%; 35–44: 17.5%; 45–54: 19.2%; 55–64: 15.6%; 65+: 17.2%; 
(3) Race/Ethnicity: White: 69.0%; Hispanic: 13.6%; Black: 11.2%; Asian: 4.3%; Other: 1.9%; and 
(4) Census Region: Northeast: 18%; Midwest: 22%; South: 37%; West: 23%.  
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through iPad applications, and were rewarded with iTunes dollars. While 
the rewards varied, all respondents received compensation of about fifty 
cents per five minutes of survey time. The survey was online for two 
weeks in October 2014. In total, 2215 people took the poll, which is a 
large enough sample for us to draw inferences about the national 
population as a whole.
89
  
The survey is included in its entirety as Appendix A, so rather than 
reproduce all of the questions here, we direct interested readers to the end 
of the Article. The survey began by asking respondents to identify basic 
information about themselves, such as their gender, age, race/ethnicity,
90
 
state of residence, education level,
91
 and household income.
92
 After 
soliciting this demographic data, the survey provided a short introduction 
to state law, state constitutions, and the federal Constitution. The purpose 
of this introduction, which is excerpted below, was to better acquaint 
respondents with the documents they would then be asked about: 
As you may know, each state has its own constitution, which takes 
precedence over other kinds of state law such as statutes and 
regulations. If ordinary state law conflicts with the state 
constitution, it is the state constitution that has to be followed. State 
constitutions cannot contradict the federal United States 
Constitution, but they can provide additional protections and cover 
additional areas. 
 State legislators often face a choice between including policies 
in the state constitution or in ordinary state law. There are several 
differences between these options. First, when policies are placed in 
the state constitution, they are harder to change in the future. 
Amending a state constitution is always more difficult than 
amending a regular state law. Second, policies that are in the state 
constitution are often considered more “fundamental” than policies 
in ordinary state law. States commonly include policies that they see 
as especially important in the state constitution. And third, policies 
 
 
 89. However, not all respondents completed all of the questions; only 2056 respondents 
completed the survey entirely. We also excluded respondents from Washington, D.C., Puerto Rico, 
and foreign countries, as we have no information on their constitutions, leaving us with a usable 
sample of 2046.  
 90. Like the census, we asked separately whether the respondent is Hispanic.   
 91. We offered ten possible education levels, and later aggregated all responses indicating 
education beyond a master’s degree. 
 92. We offered six income ranges, the lowest of which was less than $30,000, and the highest of 
which was greater than $500,000. 
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that are in the state constitution can be used by courts to invalidate 
policies that are in ordinary state law. In other words, if ordinary 
state law violates the state constitution, the ordinary state law must 
be struck down. 
Following this passage, the survey presented respondents with a list of 
twenty-nine substantive policies along with brief explanations of what 
their adoption would entail. For example, the “right to unionize” “would 
allow workers to join unions even when their employers object to their 
membership.” The “obligation to establish a state university” “would 
create an obligation for the state to fund a state university that is available 
to admitted residents at a subsidized rate.” The “right to gender equality” 
“would ensure that women are treated as equal to men by the state.” And 
the “prohibition of the death penalty” “would ensure that the death penalty 
is never imposed, even for the worst crimes.” Again, the full list of 
policies and explanations is available in Appendix A. 
We formed this list by perusing the texts of current state constitutions 
in search of provisions that (1) represent substantive policy choices; and 
(2) are found in multiple state charters but not in the federal Constitution. 
On the one hand, we wanted to identify provisions that are actually 
plausible elements of state constitutions. On the other, we did not want to 
include provisions that are also present in the federal Constitution, since 
their greater familiarity could induce respondents to support including 
them in state constitutions irrespective of their merits. Based on these 
guidelines, we compiled policies in the areas of employment, education, 
welfare, marriage, criminal justice, the environment, and several others. 
We also had two experts on state constitutional law inspect our list, and 
are grateful for their feedback.
93
 
For all of these policies, the survey asked respondents whether they 
would like to see them included in their state’s constitution. The answers 
to these questions are our core measure of people’s substantive 
constitutional preferences. However, one potential concern with this 
approach is that people might conflate their constitutional with their 
ordinary legal preferences. In other words, they might respond based on 
whether they approve of the policy generally, not whether they want it 
enshrined in their constitution specifically.
94
 To mitigate this risk, the 
 
 
 93. These were Doug Spencer, a law professor at the University of Connecticut, and Emily 
Zackin, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University. Cf. EMILY ZACKIN, LOOKING FOR RIGHTS IN 
ALL THE WRONG PLACES: WHY STATE CONSTITUTIONS CONTAIN AMERICA’S POSITIVE RIGHTS 
(2013). 
 94. See Versteeg, supra note 47, at 1154 (discussing this problem).  
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survey first asked respondents, for the same twenty-nine provisions, 
whether they would like to see them included in their state’s regular laws. 
Only after respondents answered these questions were they asked whether 
they would like to see the provisions incorporated into their state’s 
constitution. The aim here was to encourage people to separate their 
constitutional from their ordinary legal preferences, and to take into 
account the ways in which constitutions differ from conventional 
legislation. 
The survey next asked respondents to assess, on a scale from one to 
ten, how strongly they approve of the federal Constitution and of their 
state’s constitution. (The survey also asked about support for state law, 
again in order to prompt people to distinguish between their constitutional 
and non-constitutional attitudes.) These questions capture constitutional 
(and statutory) backing, and generate the dependent variables for all of our 
models. Their wording also is essentially identical to prior polls of other 
institutions’ approval, thus increasing our confidence in the questions’ 
validity and facilitating inter-institutional comparisons.
95
 However, unlike 
those other polls, these questions have never been posed before, and so 
their answers are of particular interest. 
The survey further included items that inquired about respondents’ 
constitutional and civic knowledge, as well as their partisanship and 
patriotism. These items all correspond to additional hypotheses about the 
sources of constitutional approval, and they were drafted as follows: Three 
questions asked respondents to rate their (self-professed) familiarity with 
the federal Constitution, their state constitution, and their state’s laws on a 
scale from one to five. Two questions asked respondents how closely they 
(claim to) follow the national and local news, with possible responses 
ranging from “not closely at all” to “very closely.” Two more questions 
asked respondents how proud they are, on a ten-point scale, to live in the 
United States and in their particular state. And a final question asked 
respondents about the political party to which they belong (Democratic, 
Republican, independent, or other). 
The survey ended with two quizzes that tried to test whether 
respondents read our explanations carefully and understood our questions. 
Specifically, we asked (1) whether state constitutions are easier or harder 
to amend than ordinary state law; and (2) whether state constitutions are 
 
 
 95. See generally Part I.B (discussing these polls’ findings). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
136 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:113 
 
 
 
 
more or less fundamental than ordinary state law. Respondents who gave 
wrong answers to both questions were removed from our sample.
96
  
B. Congruence Scores 
By themselves, the survey responses allow us to evaluate some but not 
all of our hypotheses about constitutional approval. One claim we cannot 
assess on this basis alone is the proposition that people prefer constitutions 
whose substantive content more accurately reflects their preferences. To 
test this hypothesis, we need a measure of congruence that compares 
people’s constitutional views with the documents’ operative provisions, 
and then determines how close the fit is. 
The survey itself captured respondents’ preferences because it asked 
them, for twenty-nine policies, whether they would like to see the 
measures included in their state’s constitution. The missing piece is thus 
the actual content of each charter, the provisions it in fact happens to 
enshrine. To obtain this information, two research assistants coded all fifty 
state constitutions and recorded whether each of the twenty-nine policies 
is present in each document. The assistants agreed in their judgments in 
the vast majority of cases, and all discrepancies were resolved by the 
authors.
97
  
Our basic coding rule was that, for a provision to count as included, 
the constitution must explicitly require the state to carry out the policy. 
When the constitution merely provides that the state “may” do something, 
or “shall have the power” to do something, we did not mark the policy as 
present.
98
 Our coding also was based only on the state constitution’s text, 
and did not take into account judicial interpretations of the language. We 
believe this approach is appropriate because, unlike the federal 
 
 
 96. A total of sixty-nine respondents gave wrong answers to both questions. These respondents 
did not differ significantly in any demographic category from those who gave at least one correct 
answer. Unfortunately, a substantial portion of respondents misunderstood our question on the 
difficulty/ease of state constitutional amendment. Twenty-eight percent of all respondents answered 
this question incorrectly. We did not want to exclude all of these respondents because doing so would 
have substantially reduced our sample size.  
 97. The inter-coder reliability is 0.92. That is, out of 1950 coding decisions, the coders disagreed 
on 165, which were subsequently resolved by the authors. Most of these 165 disagreements concerned 
provisions relating to debtors, which proved to be difficult to code.  
 98. For example, we excluded Montana (“The legislature may provide such economic assistance 
and social and rehabilitative services for those who, by reason of age, infirmities, or misfortune are 
determined by the legislature to be in need”), MONT. CONST. art. XII, § 3, cl. 3 (emphasis added), and 
Nebraska (“Laws may be enacted regulating the hours and conditions of employment of women and 
children, and securing to such employees a proper minimum wage”). NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 8 
(emphasis added). This approach is consistent with Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 38, at 1684–85. 
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Constitution, state constitutions are long and detailed documents that are 
subject to frequent revision. As a result, there are fewer opportunities for 
courts to interpret many of their provisions.
99
  
We calculated respondents’ congruence scores by pairing their 
constitutional preferences with our coding of their states’ constitutions. 
That is, each score represents the proportion of a respondent’s preferred 
policies that are actually found in her state’s constitution. We consider 
there to be congruence both when a respondent supports a given policy 
and this policy is included in her constitution, and when a respondent 
opposes a policy and it is not included. The resulting scores thus have a 
theoretical range of zero (none of the respondent’s preferences are 
incorporated) to one (all of the respondent’s preferences are enshrined).  
C. Non-Substantive Features 
A final hypothesis the survey itself cannot address is the possibility 
that constitutions’ non-substantive features—in particular, their age, 
length, and amendment frequency—influence constitutional approval. We 
therefore collected data on these characteristics from a number of sources. 
Westlaw and the Green Papers, among other resources, list when all state 
constitutions were adopted; with this information it is trivial to calculate 
each charter’s current age.100 One of us previously determined the total 
number of words in each state constitution, and we reuse those figures 
here.
101
 Lastly, The Book of the States documents the total number of 
amendments to each state constitution since its adoption.
102
  
III. DESCRIPTIVE EXPLORATION 
Having perhaps taxed our readers’ patience with this long buildup, we 
are now in a position to present our findings on constitutional approval. 
Our presentation in this Part is mostly descriptive; we first identify the 
levels of federal and state constitutional support, and then explore how 
they vary along several dimensions. In the next Part we turn from 
description to explanation. We build regression models in stages for 
federal and state constitutional backing, thus illuminating several of the 
 
 
 99. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 38, at 1699–1703. 
 100. See Constitutions of the Several States, THE GREEN PAPERS, http://www.thegreenpapers.com/ 
slg/constitution.phtml [https://perma.cc/64GZ-R2HD] (last visited Mar. 1, 2015). 
 101. See Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 38, at 1655. 
 102. See AUDREY WALL, COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES (2012), 
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2012-chapter-1-state-constitutions. 
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factors responsible for them. In both Parts, we consider the same five sets 
of hypotheses in the same order, involving (1) demographic attributes, 
(2) civic knowledge, (3) institutional attitudes, (4) constitutional 
congruence, and (5) non-substantive constitutional features. 
A. Overall Levels 
We begin with the overall levels and distributions of constitutional 
approval. By and large, Americans strongly back their federal 
Constitution. Its average approval score is 7.8 out of 10, and its median 
score is even higher at 9. As the dotted density curve in Figure 1 indicates, 
a full 20% of respondents give it the maximum approval score of 10, while 
only about 5% rate it below 5. In partial contrast, the average approval 
score for state constitutions is 6.7 out of 10, and the median score is 8—
noticeably, though not dramatically, lower. As the solid density curve in 
Figure 1 shows, only about 8% of respondents award their state charter the 
maximum score of 10, while more than 10% rank it below 5. It thus is fair 
to conclude that state constitutions are somewhat less popular than their 
federal counterpart. (Though popularity, of course, is not the same as 
merit. As we observed earlier, it is possible for constitutions to be too 
admired given their actual design and performance.
103
)  
 
 
 103. See infra note 228 and accompanying text. We also note that we did not ask respondents if 
they had recently moved to either America or their state. It is possible that constitutional approval 
varies based on how long a respondent has lived in her current location.  
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FIGURE 1: FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
DISTRIBUTIONS 
 
B. Geography and Demography 
We next consider how constitutional approval varies geographically 
and demographically. The two maps in Figure 2 depict the average 
approval scores in each state for the federal Constitution and the state 
constitution. They reveal that, in most states, support is in line with the 
national average, but that there are a few modest exceptions. Specifically, 
average federal constitutional approval falls below 7.5 in Massachusetts, 
New York, and Vermont (all liberal northeastern states), while it exceeds 
7.8 in Alabama, Idaho, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South 
Dakota, and Utah (all conservative southern and western states). Similarly, 
average state constitutional approval is less than 6.6 in Alabama, Georgia, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, and Utah (mostly conservative southern 
states), and more than 6.8 in Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, New Hampshire, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming (mostly 
conservative western states).  
We also note that these state-level estimates were not produced 
through crude disaggregation (that is, simply calculating averages for each 
state’s respondents), but rather through a more sophisticated technique 
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known as multilevel regression and poststratification (MRP), which we 
describe briefly in the margin.
104
 MRP is considerably more accurate than 
disaggregation when (as here) the samples in each state are relatively 
small. In these circumstances, though, MRP also tends to produce more 
tightly bounded estimates because it uses information from the entire 
country to estimate public opinion in each state. This feature of MRP 
explains why the states’ constitutional approval scores are all relatively 
close to one another. The limited state-specific information is outweighed 
by the greater volume of national data. 
 
 
 104. MRP models respondent opinion as a function of both individual- and state-level 
characteristics, thus producing an opinion estimate for each of many demographic “types” in each 
state. The average opinion for the state then can be computed by weighing the opinion of each type by 
the U.S. census estimate for the frequency of the type in the state’s population. MRP has been 
validated repeatedly in the academic literature and has been shown to produce more accurate estimates 
than disaggregation. See, e.g., ANDREW GELMAN & JENNIFER HILL, DATA ANALYSIS USING 
REGRESSION AND MULTILEVEL/HIERARCHICAL MODELS (2007); Yair Ghitza & Andrew Gelman, 
Deep Interactions with MRP: Election Turnout and Voting Patterns Among Small Electoral 
Subgroups, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 762 (2013); Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, How Should We 
Estimate Public Opinion in the States?, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI.107 (2009). More information on how we 
modeled respondents’ constitutional preferences through MRP is available from the authors upon 
request.  
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FIGURE 2: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY STATE 
 
 
Shifting to demographics, Figure 3 shows how constitutional approval 
differs by race, gender, education, income, and age. The dots in each chart 
represent the means for the various groups, while the vertical lines 
represent the 95% confidence intervals around the means. When the 
confidence intervals for groups do not overlap, the differences between the 
groups’ means are statistically significant.105 
 
 
 105. Note, however, that even when the confidence intervals do overlap, the differences between 
the groups’ means might still be statistically significant. See Andrea Knezevic, Overlapping 
Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance, STATNEWS (Cornell Univ. Statistical Consulting 
Grp., Ithaca, N.Y.), Oct. 2008.  
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As to race, African Americans’ approval scores are lower than those 
of Caucasians and other groups (Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, and 
Native Americans).
106
 As to gender, men’s approval scores are higher than 
women’s. As to education, the approval scores of respondents with at least 
four years of college are higher than those of people with less schooling. 
As to income, the approval scores of respondents whose households make 
at least $50,000 per year are higher than those of less well-compensated 
people. And as to age, the approval scores of respondents over thirty-five 
are higher than those of their younger peers. In many cases, however, 
these differences are relatively small and, as we show in the next Part, not 
statistically significant once other variables are incorporated into the 
analysis. 
 
 
 106. Following the census, Hispanics are not treated as a different racial group. In our survey, 
people were first asked whether they are Hispanic, after which they could indicate whether they are 
Caucasian, African American, Asian, Pacific Islander, or Other. For ease of presentation, we aggregate 
Asians, Pacific Islanders, Native Americans, and those who identify as Other. We did not find any 
meaningful differences between these groups. We also found that there was almost no gap between the 
average approval of Hispanics and non-Hispanics.  
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FIGURES 3: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBUTES 
 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
144 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/6
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] THE CONTOURS OF CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 145 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Civic Knowledge 
Proceeding to respondents’ civic knowledge, Figure 4 plots average 
approval scores for different levels of federal and state constitutional 
familiarity, along with their 95% confidence intervals. It indicates that 
those who (think they) know their charters better also back them more 
strongly. In particular, respondents who rate their knowledge of the federal 
Constitution as 1 out of 5 have an average approval score of 4.1, while 
those who claim their knowledge is a perfect 5 have an average score of 
9.0. Likewise, respondents who assess their knowledge of their state 
constitution as 1 have an average approval score of 4.5, while those who 
assert maximum knowledge have an average score of 8.7.  
While these results suggest that constitutional familiarity and approval 
are intertwined, some caution is in order. Our questions did not test 
respondents’ actual knowledge of either the federal Constitution or their 
state charters. It is possible that the relationship between genuine 
knowledge and approval is quite different. It is also possible that 
respondents believe they are familiar with their constitutions because they 
support them, or that both support and professed familiarity stem from the 
same general positive attitude toward the documents. Unfortunately, our 
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research design does not allow us to probe further these psychological 
aspects of respondents’ answers.107 
However, our survey responses do allow us to say a bit more about 
individuals who claim intimate familiarity with their constitutions. 
Respondents who rate their knowledge of their state constitution as 4 or 5 
are better educated than other subjects (45% versus 37% with at least four 
years of college), younger (median age of 42 versus 49), wealthier (58% 
versus 46% with household income above $50,000), more liberal (38% 
versus 31% with left-of-center views), more likely to be Democrats (47% 
versus 39%), and more likely to be male (57% versus 45%).
108
 There are 
similar differences between respondents who rank their knowledge of the 
federal Constitution as 4 or 5 and other subjects.
109
 Also notably, 
purportedly higher-knowledge respondents do not score any better on our 
quizzes than their ostensibly lower-knowledge peers. In fact, they score 
worse in one case, with 42% of higher-state-knowledge subjects wrongly 
stating that state constitutions are easier to amend than ordinary state law 
versus 20% of lower-state-knowledge respondents.
110
 These figures hint 
(but do not prove) that a gap may exist between professed and actual 
understanding of the constitution. They thus confirm the need to take our 
findings about constitutional knowledge with a grain of salt—and to study 
the concept further in the future. 
 
 
 107. Nor does the academic literature, which has focused almost exclusively on actual (as opposed 
to professed) political knowledge, shed any insight on this point. Cf. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & 
SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS (1996). 
 108. There are not significant racial differences between the two groups, as 75% of higher-
knowledge respondents and 79% of lower-knowledge respondents identify as white. 
 109. Specifically, respondents who rate their knowledge of the federal Constitution as 4 or 5 are 
better educated than other subjects (45% versus 33% with at least four years of college), wealthier 
(56% versus 43% with household income above $50,000), more liberal (36% versus 29% with left-of-
center views), and more likely to be male (56% versus 40%). However, they are not appreciably 
younger (median age of forty-six versus forty-eight) or more likely to be Democrats (42% versus 
41%). 
 110. In all other cases, the two groups score about equally well on the quizzes. Twenty-nine 
percent of higher-federal-knowledge respondents and 26% of lower-federal-knowledge respondents 
wrongly think that state constitutions are easier to amend than ordinary state law. And 13% of higher-
state-knowledge respondents, 15% of lower-state-knowledge respondents, 12% of higher-federal-
knowledge respondents, and 19% of lower-federal-knowledge respondents wrongly think that state 
constitutions are less fundamental than ordinary state law. 
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FIGURE 4: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY SELF-REPORTED CONSTITUTIONAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
Constitutional knowledge, though, is not the only form of familiarity 
that appears to be related to constitutional approval. The same is true for 
knowledge of public affairs more generally. Figure 5 displays average 
federal and state constitutional approval scores, along with their 95% 
confidence intervals, for different levels of familiarity with the national 
and local news, respectively. Possible responses range from following the 
news “very closely” to “not closely at all.” At the federal level, those most 
attentive to the news have an average approval score of 8.4, while those 
least attentive have an average score of 5.8. The same pattern holds at the 
state level: the most avid local newshounds have an average approval 
score of 7.3, compared to 5.2 for those who do not follow the local news at 
all. These findings further suggest that knowledge is connected to 
approval—albeit with the same caveat as before about actual and claimed 
observation of the news not being the same.  
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FIGURE 5: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY SELF-REPORTED FOLLOWING OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL NEWS 
 
D. Institutional Attitudes 
The final characteristics of respondents themselves (as opposed to their 
constitutions) for which we have information are their general institutional 
attitudes: that is, their feelings toward their country, state, and party. 
Figure 6 plots average federal and state constitutional approval scores, 
along with their 95% confidence intervals, for different levels of national 
and state pride, respectively. It shows that approval and jurisdictional 
pride are closely correlated. At the federal level, people who rate their 
national pride as 1 out of 10 have an average approval score of 3.8, while 
those who are maximally proud of their country have an average score of 
8.5. Similarly, at the state level, people who are least proud of their state 
have an average approval score of 3.3, while those who are most proud 
have an average score of 8.2. Jurisdictional pride thus seems as strongly 
related to constitutional approval as either of the knowledge variables we 
considered above. 
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FIGURE 6: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY JURISDICTIONAL PRIDE 
 
Our results for party affiliation are also notable, though not quite as 
stark. Figure 7 displays average federal and state constitutional approval 
scores, along with their 95% confidence intervals, for Democrats, 
Republicans, and independents. At both levels, Republicans are stauncher 
constitutional supporters than other parties’ members. Their average 
federal approval score is 8.1, compared to 7.8 for Democrats and 7.5 for 
independents. Likewise, their average state approval score is 7.1, 
compared to 6.8 for Democrats and 6.4 for independents.
111
 These 
differences are larger than most of the demographic gaps we identified 
earlier. But they are substantially smaller than the variations by civic 
knowledge and institutional pride. 
 
 
 111. The category of independents also includes the forty-nine respondents who identified their 
party affiliation as “other.” 
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FIGURE 7: MEAN FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 
BY PARTISAN AFFILIATION 
 
E. Constitutional Congruence 
We now turn to factors that involve not just respondents’ own 
attributes but also those of their constitutions. Again, these factors are 
available solely at the state level since, at the federal level, there is only 
one constitution and so no possibility of comparison. Starting with 
constitutional congruence, we explained above that we calculated it by 
comparing respondents’ preferences on twenty-nine constitutional policies 
with the provisions actually present in their states’ charters.112 The 
resulting congruence scores range from 0.14 (4 out of 29 preferred policies 
included in the constitution) to 0.97 (28 out of 29 preferred policies 
included).
113
 This wide spectrum is itself quite interesting, as it indicates 
that state constitutional law differs greatly in its fit with people’s views.  
 
 
 112. See supra Part II.B.  
 113. When calculating the congruence scores we found that respondents’ answers often are 
different for inclusion in state law than for inclusion in the state constitution. In almost all cases, 
respondents are more likely to say they want a policy included in state law than to say they want it to 
be constitutionally protected. This suggests that respondents did actually separate their constitutional 
from their ordinary legal preferences, as we had hoped they would. The one notable exception is the 
prohibition of the death penalty: 42% of respondents want to constitutionally ban it, while only 38% 
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Figure 8 plots average state constitutional approval scores, along with 
their 95% confidence intervals, for each level of congruence (displayed 
here as the raw number of each respondent’s preferred policies that are 
constitutionally enshrined, and varying from 4/29 to 28/29). Strikingly, 
and unlike the results in Figures 5 to 7, Figure 8 does not reveal an 
ascending pattern with approval positively related to congruence. Instead, 
many respondents whose constitutional preferences are barely satisfied 
still rate their charter favorably, while many respondents whose 
constitutional views are largely heeded still do not support their charter 
very strongly. For most levels of congruence, the average level of approval 
stays roughly constant and seems impervious to variations in fit. While 
this analysis does not control for other possible causes of constitutional 
approval, it does hint that congruence may not be as closely tied to it as 
the theoretical literature asserts. 
FIGURE 8: MEAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL BY 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRUENCE 
 
 
 
want to ban it via regular state law. This suggests that people think of prohibiting the death penalty as 
a truly constitutional issue. 
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F. Non-Substantive Features 
Our other constitutional variables relate not to the charters’ actual 
content but rather to their key non-substantive features: their age (in 
years), length (in words), and amendment frequency (in number). As these 
are all continuous state-level variables, we cannot display them using the 
same sorts of charts we have used until now. Instead, Figure 9 plots 
respondents’ state constitutional approval scores against these non-
substantive features, with best fit lines included as well. These scatter plots 
reveal no discernible pattern in the data, and thus suggest that there is 
essentially no relationship between approval and constitutional age, 
length, or amendment frequency. In fact, the correlations between 
approval and these variables are just 0.004, -0.002, and 0.002, 
respectively. Again, this analysis does not hold constant any other drivers 
of approval, but it certainly lends no support to the notion that people’s 
constitutional attitudes are shaped by their charters’ non-substantive 
dimensions. 
FIGURE 9: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL VERSUS NON-
SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES 
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IV. EXPLANATORY ANALYSIS 
To this point, our exploration of the data has been entirely descriptive. 
We have shown how federal and state constitutional approval scores vary 
along several notable dimensions, including geography, demography, and 
self-reported knowledge and attitudes. While this sort of analysis helps to 
detect patterns in the data, it does not take into account various 
confounding factors. For example, people who are more constitutionally 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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knowledgeable might also follow the news more closely, making it unclear 
which factor is more associated with constitutional approval once we 
control for the other. Similarly, race, income, and education might be 
interrelated in ways that make it impossible to draw reliable conclusions 
from statistics for a single attribute in isolation.  
To assess the causes of constitutional approval more rigorously, we 
therefore turn to regression analysis. Unlike descriptive exploration, 
regression analysis enables us to determine the impact of different 
variables while holding other variables constant. To illustrate, we can 
evaluate how constitutional knowledge affects constitutional approval 
while controlling for the correlation between knowledge and attentiveness 
to the news. Likewise, we can discern the link between race and approval 
notwithstanding the many ties between race and other demographic 
characteristics. 
However, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this 
method. The basic advantage of regression analysis is that it allows us to 
hold other variables constant—but not all other variables can be controlled 
for. In particular, it is possible that there exist factors, either personal or 
constitutional, that are correlated with both our independent variables and 
constitutional approval, but that are omitted from our models. These 
factors could be the actual drivers of constitutional backing, but we would 
not be able to observe their impact since they are excluded from our 
calculations. The possible existence of these omitted variables limits our 
ability to make causal claims. Nevertheless, regression analysis does at 
least shed light on the plausibility of different hypotheses, and so launches 
the systematic study of support for constitutions. 
We begin below with base models of federal and state constitutional 
approval that include only demographic attributes. We then build up these 
models in stages, adding in turn civic knowledge, institutional attitudes, 
and in the state model, constitutional congruence and non-substantive 
constitutional features. In all regressions, the dependent variables are 
respondents’ stated support for the federal Constitution or their state 
constitution. Even though these variables are on a ten-point scale, and so 
ordinal in nature, we use simple linear (OLS) regression models because 
their results are easier to interpret.
114
 We also confirm the robustness of 
 
 
 114. An additional advantage of OLS models is that we can include state fixed effects, which 
allow us to hold constant differences across states. Fixed effects estimation is not possible in an 
ordered probit model that takes into account the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. Specifically, 
the incidental parameters problem causes coefficients to be biased. See James J. Heckman, The 
Incidental Parameters Problem and the Problem of Initial Conditions in Estimating a Discrete Time-
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our findings by using ordered probit models that are suited to ordinal data. 
Furthermore, since there likely exist significant differences between states 
(after all, each state has its own constitution), we include separate dummy 
variables for all states. This technique, known as fixed effects estimation, 
controls for all interstate variations due to politics, economics, 
demography, or culture.
115
 Lastly, since answers from respondents in the 
same state might be correlated with one another, we use robust standard 
errors clustered at the state level, thus allowing for serial correlation 
between same-state respondents.  
A. Demographic Attributes 
As just noted, our base models of federal and state constitutional 
approval include only the demographic attributes asked about by our 
survey. These are: (1) a binary variable for gender (0 if female, 1 if male); 
(2) a continuous variable for age (in years); (3) two binary variables for 
race, one indicating whether the respondent is African American, the other 
whether she belongs to another minority group (Asian American, Pacific 
Islander, or Native American); (4) an ordinal variable for education, 
ranging from less than high school to a doctorate or its equivalent; and 
(5) an ordinal variable for income, ranging from below $30,000 to above 
$500,000.
116
 
The two panels in Figure 10 graphically depict the results of these 
models (federal on the left, state on the right). For each variable, the point 
represents the best estimate of its coefficient’s value—that is, the impact 
of a one-unit shift in the variable on constitutional approval, holding the 
other variables constant. The lines to either side of each point denote the 
95% confidence interval for the coefficient’s value. We can say with 95% 
certainty that the coefficient’s true value falls within this range. And the 
stars above each point illustrate how confident we are that the coefficient’s 
true value is different from zero. Three stars (***) indicate confidence at 
the 99% level, two stars (**) confidence at the 95% level, and one star (*) 
confidence at the 90% level.  
In the federal model, being male, older, better educated, and wealthier 
all are associated with increased constitutional approval. The findings for 
 
 
Discrete Data Stochastic Process, in STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF DISCRETE DATA 179 (Charles F. 
Manski & Daniel L. McFadden eds., 1981). 
 115. In the ordered probit models that we use as a robustness check, we calculate state-specific 
intercepts by calculating a random effects model.  
 116. The survey questions can be found in their entirety in Appendix A. 
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gender, age, and education are especially clear, rising to statistical 
significance at the 99% level. Men support the federal Constitution by 
roughly 0.35 points more than women. A nineteen-year increase in age 
(the span famously identified by Thomas Jefferson as the duration of a 
constitutional generation
117
) results in about a 0.5-point rise in backing. 
And a one-level increase in education produces an approval boost of 0.1 
points or so. On the other hand, being African American is linked to a 
substantial decrease in constitutional support. Blacks back the federal 
Constitution by roughly 0.25 points less than whites. And membership in 
other racial minority groups is statistically unrelated to approval.
118
 
The results at the state level are extremely similar. Men, older people, 
and wealthier people again support their constitutions more strongly 
(though the coefficients for gender and age are not quite as large as at the 
federal level). And African Americans again are less constitutionally 
satisfied (by an even larger margin than before). The only notable 
difference between the analyses is that education does not have a 
significant impact on backing in the state model. Demographics, then, play 
an almost identical role in explaining federal and state constitutional 
approval. People’s attitudes toward both of their charters are shaped in 
equivalent fashion by their key personal characteristics.
119
 
 
 
 117. See Jefferson Letter, supra note 38, at 393–94 (calculating that eighteen years and eight 
months is the length of a generation, and concluding that “19 years is the term beyond which neither 
the representatives of a nation, nor even the whole nation itself assembled, can validly extend a debt”). 
 118. The full results of all of the OLS models are available in Appendix B. For robustness, we 
also estimated ordered probit models with random effects. The full results of all of these models are 
available in Appendix C. Here, we find that the output of the ordered probit model is about the same as 
that of the OLS regression. The sole exception is income, which is no longer statistically significant. 
See infra apps. B & C. 
 119. The results of the OLS model are almost perfectly confirmed by the corresponding ordered 
probit model. See infra apps. B & C. 
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FIGURE 10: EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL: 
DEMOGRAPHIC ATTRIBUTES 
 
B. Civic Knowledge 
Of course, the base models include only respondents’ demographic 
attributes, but we also want to test several additional hypotheses about 
constitutional approval. So we now begin to add in stages more variables 
to the models, beginning here with the ones related to civic knowledge. 
Specifically, we now add (6) respondents’ self-reported familiarity with 
the federal Constitution and their state constitution, on a five-point scale; 
and (7) how closely respondents follow the national and local news, 
ranging from “not closely at all” to “very closely.” We also note that, to 
save space and avoid confusion, we only discuss the results for the newly 
added variables in each of the intermediate models we construct. While 
the insertion of these variables affects the coefficients for the variables 
already present in the models, we save our discussion of all of the 
potential causes of constitutional approval until we arrive at the final 
federal and state models. Again, the final federal model includes only 
respondent-specific factors, while the final state model includes 
constitutional features too. 
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At the federal level, as Figure 11 indicates, self-reported familiarity 
with the federal Constitution and attentiveness to the national news are 
strongly associated with constitutional approval. Both variables are 
statistically significant at the 99% level, and their coefficients are 
substantively large as well. A one-point increase in constitutional 
familiarity results in almost a one-point rise in constitutional support. 
Similarly, a one-level increase in attentiveness to the national news (e.g., 
from “not so closely” to “somewhat closely”) produces about a 0.25-point 
bump in backing. These results, which control for all of the demographic 
attributes already included in the models, are quite substantial. Civic 
knowledge seems clearly related to federal constitutional approval.
120
 
As Figure 11 also reveals, the same is true at the state level. Self-
reported familiarity with the state constitution and attentiveness to the 
local news both are significantly linked, at the 99% level, to state 
constitutional support. A one-point increase in constitutional familiarity 
again results in almost a one-point rise in constitutional backing. Likewise, 
a one-level increase in local news attentiveness again produces about a 
0.3-point spike in approval. These findings mean that civic knowledge, 
like demography, is connected in very similar ways to people’s attitudes 
toward both of their charters. Knowledge and approval appear to go hand 
in hand no matter which constitution is at issue.
121
 
 
 
 120. The results of the OLS model are largely confirmed by the corresponding ordered probit 
model. The only difference is that the African American coefficient is statistically significant in the 
latter model. See infra apps. B & C. 
 121. The results of the OLS model are almost perfectly confirmed by the corresponding ordered 
probit model. See infra apps. B & C. 
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FIGURE 11: EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL: CIVIC 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
C. Institutional Attitudes 
The next group of variables we add to our models involve 
respondents’ institutional attitudes. In particular, we add (8) respondents’ 
pride in living in the United States and in their state, on a ten-point scale; 
and (9) two binary variables for partisan affiliation, one indicating whether 
the respondent is a Republican, the other whether she is a Democrat. As 
these are the final variables available at the federal level, we also comment 
on the coefficients of all of the other variables in the federal model. But 
we reserve our discussion of all of the state-level coefficients until we 
have constructed the final state model in Part IV.E. 
As Figure 12 shows, pride in one’s country is powerfully linked to 
federal constitutional approval. The variable is significant at the 99% 
level, and a one-point increase in national pride results in roughly a 0.3-
point rise in constitutional support. However, partisan affiliation is 
unrelated to backing. Controlling for all other variables, both Republicans 
and Democrats are no more likely than independents to approve of the 
federal Constitution.  
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As this is the final federal model, how do all of the other variables 
perform here? Both civic knowledge variables (federal constitutional 
familiarity and national news attentiveness) continue to have a strong 
positive impact on constitutional support. Several of the demographic 
variables also have the same signs and significance as in the original 
model. Older and better educated people still back the Constitution more 
strongly, and African Americans still are less satisfied with it. However, 
neither gender nor income is significant in the final model. Evidently, their 
effects on approval dissipate once other relevant variables are taken into 
account.
122
 
As Figure 12 further illustrates, state pride is a potent driver of state 
constitutional support too. The variable is significant at the 99% level, and 
a one-point increase in it results in about a 0.45-point rise in constitutional 
backing. But unlike in the federal model, Republican affiliation is 
significant at the 99% level as well. Controlling for all other variables, 
Republicans approve of their state constitution by about 0.3 points more 
than independents. This represents one of the most striking differences 
between the federal and state models. Partisanship is entangled with state 
constitutional attitudes in a way it is not with feelings toward the federal 
Constitution.
123
 
 
 
 122. The results of the OLS model are largely confirmed by the corresponding ordered probit 
model. The only differences are that gender and income are statistically significant in the latter model 
(though only at the 10% level), while education is not. See infra apps. B & C. 
 123. The results of the OLS model are largely confirmed by the corresponding ordered probit 
model. The only difference is that gender is statistically significant in the latter model (though only at 
the 10% level). See infra apps. B & C. 
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FIGURE 12: EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL: 
INSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDES 
 
D. Constitutional Congruence 
We proceed next to constitutional variables that are available only at 
the state level, where there exist fifty charters instead of one. We first add 
to our state model (10) constitutional congruence, that is, the proportion of 
each respondent’s preferred constitutional policies that actually are present 
in her state’s charter. As Figure 13’s left panel indicates, congruence fails 
to rise to statistical significance. Its coefficient also is substantively very 
small, with the 95% confidence interval hovering around zero and the best 
estimate being that a one-point increase in congruence produces only a 
0.005-point rise in constitutional approval. This finding confirms the 
picture painted by the earlier descriptive analysis: namely, that congruence 
and support are essentially unrelated in the state constitutional context.
124
 
 
 
 124. The results of the OLS model are largely confirmed by the corresponding ordered probit 
model. The only difference is that gender is statistically significant in the latter model (though only at 
the 10% level). See infra apps. B & C. 
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E. Non-Substantive Features 
Finally, we examine the key non-substantive features of state 
constitutions. We add to our state model (11) their age in years; (12) their 
length in words; and (13) the number of times they have been amended. 
Because these features vary across states, but not across individuals, we 
also remove the state fixed effects from the model. Instead, we calculate 
state-specific intercepts, a technique known as random effects estimation 
that is better suited to this data.
125
  
As Figure 13’s right panel reveals, none of these non-substantive 
features rises to statistical significance. In fact, their coefficients and 95% 
confidence intervals all are virtually indistinguishable from zero. The 
largest coefficient, for constitutional age, is a paltry -0.001.  
What about the other variables in this fully assembled state model? 
Congruence continues to have no significant influence on constitutional 
approval. The institutional attitude variables (state pride and Republican 
affiliation) continue to be linked positively to approval. The civic 
knowledge variables (state constitutional familiarity and local news 
attentiveness) continue to have positive impacts too. But things are more 
complicated with the demographic variables. Age still increases 
constitutional support and African American race still reduces it. Gender, 
though, is no longer significant in the full model, and income now has a 
negative rather than a positive relationship with backing for the 
constitution. Shifts of this sort are precisely why it is important to consider 
as many relevant variables as possible. Without their inclusion, one might 
well reach erroneous conclusions about the attitudinal effects of gender 
and income.
126
  
 
 
  125. We also experimented with an ordinary OLS regression without random effects. In this 
model as well, none of the non-substantive constitutional features are statistically significant predictors 
of constitutional approval.  
 126. The results of the OLS model are almost perfectly confirmed by the corresponding ordered 
probit model. See infra apps. B & C. 
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FIGURE 13: EXPLANATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL: 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONGRUENCE AND NON-SUBSTANTIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL FEATURES  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
The results of our empirical analysis have an array of important 
implications. They validate the existing literature on institutional approval 
in some respects, but undercut it in others. They suggest a set of startling 
prescriptions for leaders who want their constituents to be more supportive 
of their constitutions—above all, not to pay much heed to the documents’ 
actual content. They simultaneously confirm and challenge key claims 
made by many constitutional scholars, legal philosophers, and 
sociologists. And they give rise to a promising new research agenda, at the 
levels of both theory and empirics, for both legal academics and political 
scientists. These diverse implications are the subject of this Part. 
A. Institutional Comparisons 
We earlier summarized the scholarship on the causes of approval for 
institutions other than constitutions (in particular the Supreme Court and 
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Congress). How do our findings on constitutional approval compare to this 
scholarship? In brief, they are mostly consistent with respect to people’s 
own characteristics (demographics, knowledge, ideology, and the like), 
but sharply divergent with respect to institutional features (congruence, 
age, and so on). This pattern may be attributable to either people’s 
ignorance of their constitution or their tendency to assess it differently 
from other institutions. 
Start with people’s demographic attributes. Most prior studies have 
found that they have little effect on institutional approval.
127
 The notable 
exception is race; African Americans are less supportive of both the 
Supreme Court and state governments.
128
 Similarly, gender, membership 
in another minority group, education, and income are statistically 
insignificant in one or both of our full federal and state models.
129
 African 
American race also is significantly (and negatively) related to 
constitutional approval at both the federal and state levels.
130
 The only 
discrepancy between our results and the existing work is the positive 
impact that age has on constitutional approval in our models.
131
  
This means that demography influences people’s constitutional 
attitudes in much the same way that it affects their views of other 
institutions—which is to say quite little, except in the case of African 
American race. A possible explanation for the immateriality of most traits 
is that they have complex relationships with political ideology,
132
 which in 
turn has a complex relationship with institutional approval. There simply 
may be too many intervening steps between most traits and institutional 
approval for the former substantially to shape the latter. But the causal 
pathway may be more direct for African American race. Perhaps blacks 
tend to feel poorly treated by American institutions, and so, unmediated by 
ideology, express greater dissatisfaction with them.
133
 Zachary Elkins and 
John Sides have found that ethnic minorities worldwide are less attached 
 
 
 127. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 58–61 and accompanying text. 
 129. Specifically, gender and other race are statistically insignificant in both full models, 
education is significant in the federal but not the state model, and income is significant in the state but 
not the federal model. See infra app. B. 
 130. See infra app. B. 
 131. See infra app. B. 
 132. See JOHN HALPIN & KARL AGNE, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, STATE OF AMERICAN POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY, 2009: A NATIONAL STUDY OF POLITICAL VALUES AND BELIEFS 14 fig.1 (2009), 
https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/03/pdf/political_ideology.pdf 
(showing interesting patterns of political ideology by demographic group). 
 133. The opposite story might apply to the elderly. They generally might feel well served by 
American constitutions, and so approve of them at higher rates. 
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to their countries than majorities, and the same may be true for American 
blacks.
134
 
Second, the literature is divided as to the effect of institutional 
knowledge on institutional approval.
135
 The relationship appears to be 
positive for the Court, but negative for Congress.
136
 Our findings clearly 
place constitutions on the side of the Court. In our full models, people who 
claim greater familiarity with their constitution support it more strongly, at 
both the federal and state levels.
137
 People who follow the news closely are 
stauncher constitutional advocates too.
138
 In fact, these are among the most 
robust results to emerge from our study.
139
 
As before, a caveat must be appended here. Our survey probed 
people’s professed levels of constitutional knowledge, so we cannot say 
how their actual knowledge levels are linked to their support for the 
constitution.
140
 But if professed and actual knowledge levels are similar (a 
big if),
141
 it is easy to speculate why judicial and constitutional familiarity 
would operate equivalently. Just as those who are more exposed to 
symbols of judicial legitimacy are more inclined to approve of courts,
142
 so 
too those who are better acquainted with constitutions’ lofty phrases and 
aspirations might tend to back them more strongly. Courts and 
constitutions are allied institutions, so to know them both might be to love 
them both. 
Third, most scholarship finds that people’s attitudes toward other 
institutions (and toward government generally) correlate with their opinion 
of any particular institution.
143
 Consistent with this work, pride in one’s 
state or country is positively related to constitutional approval in both of 
our full models.
144
 Republican affiliation also is positively linked to 
approval at the state but not the federal level.
145
 Jurisdictional pride thus 
emerges as a more reliable driver of constitutional support than 
partisanship. 
 
 
 134. See Zachary Elkins & John Sides, Can Institutions Build Unity in Multiethnic States?, 101 
AM. POL. SCI. REV. 693, 697 tbl.1, 698 (2007). 
 135. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 137. See infra app. B. 
 138. See infra app. B. 
 139. See infra app. B. 
 140. See supra Part III.C. 
 141. As noted earlier, higher-knowledge respondents scored no better than lower-knowledge 
subjects on our two quizzes. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 69–73 and accompanying text. 
 144. See infra app. B. 
 145. See infra app. B. 
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Our result for jurisdictional pride is unsurprising. Just as people who 
adhere to broad democratic values, and who trust in government to do the 
right thing, tend to back other American institutions,
146
 so too would we 
expect people who are proud of their state or country to approve of its 
foundational document. But our finding for Republican affiliation (at the 
state level only) requires a different explanation. Perhaps today’s 
Republicans are more prone than their Democratic peers to extolling the 
virtues of constitutions and urging devotion to them.
147
 The recent rise of 
the Tea Party, a group named for a fabled event at the dawn of the 
American republic, lends support to this conjecture.
148
 
Fourth, the literature is nearly unanimous that policy congruence 
promotes institutional approval.
149
 People more strongly back the Court 
and Congress when the bodies’ holdings and statutes, respectively, more 
closely correspond to their preferences.
150
 However, there is no trace of 
this relationship in our full state model. People’s support for their state 
constitution is almost entirely unaffected by its level of congruence with 
their substantive views. Approval barely budges as constitutional fit varies 
from poor to excellent.
151
 
Why is constitutional congruence so much less impactful than judicial 
or legislative congruence? One possibility is that people know less about 
constitutions’ content (especially at the state level) than they do about the 
Court’s or Congress’s outputs.152 If people have no idea what is in their 
constitution, they also have no way of assessing how well it reflects their 
preferences. As noted earlier, the facts that self-professed constitutional 
knowledge has strong demographic drivers, and does not result in better 
scores on our survey’s quizzes, lend support to this hypothesis.153 
 
 
 146. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 147. See RNC, Republican Platform: We the People: A Restoration of Constitutional Government, 
GOP, http://www.gop.com/platform/we-the-people [https://perma.cc/VNC6-5CX6] (last visited Mar. 
1, 2015) (“We are the party of the Constitution, the solemn compact which . . . . [is] [p]erhaps the 
greatest political document ever written . . . .”).  
 148. See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 
105 NW. U. L. REV. 1807, 1807 (2011) (“More than any political movement in recent memory, the Tea 
Party movement is centrally focused on the meaning of the Constitution.”). 
 149. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 74–78 and accompanying text. 
 151. See infra app. B. 
 152. See, e.g., Press Release, Annenberg Pub. Policy Ctr., New Annenberg Survey Asks: “How 
Well Do Americans Understand the Constitution?” (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.annenbergpublic 
policycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/Final-CIVICS-knowledge-release-corrected2.pdf (finding that 
Americans have low knowledge of the federal Constitution). 
 153. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss1/6
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
2016] THE CONTOURS OF CONSTITUTIONAL APPROVAL 167 
 
 
 
 
Another answer is that people may lack strong views on what 
provisions should be included in their constitution. In this case, 
congruence becomes an illusory concept, since it is only made meaningful 
by the existence of opinions to which policies may (or may not) 
correspond. Still another explanation is that constitutions may differ from 
courts and legislatures in ways that make people care less about their 
substance. Perhaps courts and legislatures are seen as governmental bodies 
to be judged according to their work product, while constitutions are 
understood to stand apart from the political fray—to operate on the plane 
of jurisdictional identity rather than enacted policy. 
And fifth, quite little is known about how institutions’ non-substantive 
features influence their approval levels.
154
 In fact, only a single study has 
addressed any of the features covered by our survey, finding that courts’ 
age increases their popular support.
155
 Our result for age is to the contrary; 
in our full state model, older constitutions are no more popular than 
younger ones.
156
 Constitutional length and amendment frequency also are 
entirely unrelated to constitutional approval.
157
 
Limited knowledge again is the most likely reason why these factors 
are so inconsequential. People who are unfamiliar with their constitutions’ 
age, length, and amendment history—presumably a very large group—
cannot take them into account when evaluating the documents. And 
institutional differences between courts and constitutions may explain why 
longevity matters for the former but not the latter. Perhaps courts 
accumulate legitimacy over time, as they announce decisions and parties 
comply with them, but constitutions have no comparable method for 
building support. Perhaps, that is, Madison’s “veneration” thesis is correct 
as to courts but not as to constitutions (at least at the state level).
158
 
While these variations between constitutions’ and other institutions’ 
approval mechanisms are very interesting, readers may be forgiven for 
wanting us to get to the point. The point, of course, is what our findings 
mean for constitutional drafters and governmental leaders who agree that 
constitutional approval is important and would like to increase it. This 
crucial issue is the next one to which we turn. 
 
 
 154. See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Gibson et al., supra note 15, at 355.  
 156. See infra app. B. 
 157. See infra app. B. 
 158. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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B. Domestic Prescriptions 
We begin on a pessimistic note. The most intuitive way to make 
people more supportive of their constitution is to make it more worthy of 
their support. And the most intuitive way to make it more worthy of their 
support is to make it more consistent with their preferences. But according 
to our analysis, greater constitutional congruence does not yield greater 
constitutional approval. Approval is detached from congruence, neither 
rising nor falling as it changes. This is quite a humbling conclusion, in our 
view. Constitutional architects often think their handiworks have sweeping 
effects upon the societies they govern.
159
 But at least with respect to 
constitutional backing, the impact of constitutional design is close to nil.  
Close to nil is not nil, however. It remains possible that other aspects 
of constitutional design, not explicitly covered by our survey, do influence 
constitutional support. For instance, people may prefer constitutions that 
are written in more eloquent language, irrespective of the policies 
enshrined in the stirring words.
160
 Or they may be more receptive to 
certain fundamental choices than to others (regarding the separation of 
powers, the inclusion of a bill of rights, and so on), even while being 
indifferent to more fine-grained matters. We are skeptical of these 
hypotheses due to the knowledge and sophistication they would require of 
people. They also strike us as inapplicable to American state constitutions 
that largely resemble one another in style and substance.
161
 But we 
certainly cannot rule out the possibility that some constitutional content 
makes a difference for constitutional approval.  
Moreover, even if content makes no difference, the effect may be 
liberating rather than humbling for constitutional drafters. Drafters often 
include or exclude provisions based on their judgments as to how people 
will respond.
162
 Their choices tend to be driven partly by the merits—and 
partly by the expected public reaction.
163
 But if constitutional approval 
actually is unaffected by constitutional substance, then drafters should feel 
 
 
 159. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, The “Design Sciences” and Constitutional “Success,” 87 TEX. L. 
REV. 1339, 1339 (2009) (“[Literature on constitutional design] suggests that desirable social and 
political outcomes may be accomplished through optimal institutional planning and implementation.”). 
 160. Cf. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., STRIDE TOWARD FREEDOM 199 (1958) (“The words of the 
Supreme Court, of Congress, and of the Constitution are eloquent instructors.”).  
 161. See, e.g., Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 83, at 1596–97, 1620–21 (discussing convergence of 
“substate” constitutions).  
 162. See, e.g., Versteeg, supra note 47, at 1136 (noting academic consensus that “constitutions 
should reflect popular values”). 
 163. See id. 
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freer to adopt the policies they think are best. They should not feel as 
constrained by mass opinion in their efforts to perfect their charters.
164
 
(Though there is a potential dark side here too: If drafters are set free from 
people’s preferences, they may pursue their own advantage, or that of 
powerful interest groups, instead of the common good.) 
Still another caveat is that constitutional congruence is not irrelevant 
just because it does not result in greater backing for the document. For one 
thing, congruence arguably is an intrinsic good in a democracy. We may 
want constitutional provisions to reflect people’s views simply because 
any other outcome would undermine our commitment to popular 
sovereignty.
165
 For another, our analysis only establishes that congruence 
does not increase specific support for the constitution. It is still possible 
that it raises diffuse support (that is, constitutional legitimacy).
166
 It is also 
possible that congruence is linked to other important democratic values, 
such as participation, deliberation, or accountability.
167
 
Nevertheless, our conclusion with respect to constitutional design is 
undeniably negative. Whatever else it may be good for, it has little use as a 
tool for promoting constitutional approval. Our pessimism also extends to 
the demographic variables we studied. The two variables that reliably are 
tied to approval—African American race and age—are very difficult for 
policymakers to vary. Except in the long run, as the makeup of the 
population shifts, people’s race and age are essentially static.168 At first 
glance, education and income seem more promising because they are 
somewhat less fixed. But education is only statistically significant in our 
full federal model (the less thorough of the two), and its substantive effect 
is very small. If people could be converted from high school dropouts into 
holders of doctoral degrees, their support for the federal Constitution 
would rise by only about 0.3 points.
169
 And the link between income and 
state constitutional approval is actually negative (and substantively small 
 
 
 164. Relatedly, they should not hesitate to replace an old constitution with a new one. 
Constitutional age, like constitutional congruence, is unrelated to constitutional approval in our 
models. See infra app. B. 
 165. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
 167. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 283, 321–22 
(2014) (“[T]he alignment approach is attractive because it promotes the achievement of key 
democratic goals such as accountability, responsiveness, and legitimacy.”). 
 168. See JENNIFER M. ORTMAN ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AN AGING NATION: THE OLDER 
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2014), http://www.census.gov/prod/2014pubs/p25-1140.pdf. If 
the aging trend of the American population continues, people might become somewhat more 
supportive of the federal Constitution in the future.  
 169. See infra app. B. 
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to boot).
170
 Surely approval is not so vital a goal that its modest 
improvement justifies people’s impoverishment. 
If policymakers cannot increase backing for the constitution through 
either constitutional or demographic change, what can they do? One of the 
most potent levers identified by our analysis is making people more 
knowledgeable (or at least more inclined to say they are knowledgeable) 
about their constitution specifically and current affairs generally. Shifting 
from the lowest to the highest level of constitutional familiarity, in 
particular, results in about a three-point rise in constitutional approval at 
both the federal and state levels, even controlling for all other factors.
171
  
How, then, to bolster people’s constitutional familiarity (of either the 
actual or averred sorts)? The obvious answer is civic education.
172
 Classes 
could be offered on constitutional law, not just in law schools but also in 
colleges and secondary schools.
173
 Marketing campaigns could be 
launched to convey to people the core tenets of their charters.
174
 There 
could be contests with prizes for those who display the greatest 
constitutional knowledge.
175
 There could be exams before people receive 
certain governmental benefits or services.
176
 There could be an annual 
“deliberation day” about the constitution.177 And so on. The aim of this list 
is not to be exhaustive, but rather to show that constitutional familiarity is, 
in principle, open to improvement via governmental policy.
178
 
 
 
 170. See infra app. B. 
 171. See infra app. B. 
 172. Another, much less plausible option is to vary the factors that are correlated with self-
professed constitutional knowledge, such as gender, age, income, education, ideology, and partisan 
affiliation. See supra Section III.C. This option is unrealistic for the same reasons that demographic 
and socioeconomic variables cannot be used to improve constitutional approval. The variables are 
related only weakly to the goal, and they are too intrinsically significant to be treated as means to an 
end. 
 173. On the state of civic education in American schools, see RICHARD J. COLEY & ANDREW 
SUM, EDUC. TESTING SERV., FAULT LINES IN OUR DEMOCRACY: CIVIC KNOWLEDGE, VOTING 
BEHAVIOR, AND CIVIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 7–12 (2012), http://www.ets.org/s/ 
research/19386/rsc/pdf/18719_fault_lines_report.pdf [hereinafter FAULT LINES]. 
 174. See, e.g., CIVICS RENEWAL NETWORK, http://civicsrenewalnetwork.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 
2015) (coalition of nonprofit groups dedicated to improving civic knowledge). 
 175. Cf. ICIVICS, https://www.icivics.org/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (civics computer game 
championed by Sandra Day O’Connor). 
 176. See Rick Rojas & Motoko Rich, States Move to Make Citizenship Exams a Classroom Aid, 
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/28/us/states-move-to-make-citizenship-
exams-a-classroom-aid.html (noting move by several states toward making high school diploma 
conditional on passing citizenship exam). 
 177. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004). 
 178. Though we note that these kinds of measures may be less effective with respect to African 
Americans, whose lower constitutional approval likely stems from a more general alienation from 
American institutions, not a lack of constitutional knowledge. 
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Our findings for familiarity also lessen some of the fatalism of our 
earlier analysis. For example, the most likely explanation why congruence 
is unrelated to approval is that most people are unaware of their 
constitutions’ content.179 If they were made more aware (say, through the 
initiatives suggested above), then the same congruence-approval link that 
holds for most other institutions might emerge for constitutions too.
180
 
Similarly, people’s education and income are not strongly connected to 
their support for their constitution. But education and income are 
correlated with people’s constitutional knowledge,181 which does lead 
directly to constitutional approval. In other words, knowledge could be the 
key missing variable that explains why other hypotheses about approval 
seem to fail. 
The second effective lever revealed by our analysis involves people’s 
overall institutional attitudes. Shifting people’s jurisdictional pride from its 
minimum to its maximum produces about the same three-point approval 
boost, at both the federal and state levels, as varying their self-professed 
knowledge over an equivalent range.
182
 (On the other hand, the impact of 
switching from non-Republican to Republican affiliation is only about 0.2 
points, and accrues only at the state level.
183
 It also is hard to recommend 
partisan conversion as a strategy for increasing constitutional approval.)  
The question then becomes how to make people prouder of their state 
and country. One option again is marketing—but this time focused not on 
constitutions’ content but rather on jurisdictions’ attributes and 
achievements. The hope would be that if governments conveyed more 
positive messages to their citizens, they would respond with greater 
loyalty and appreciation.
184
 But there is something unseemly (and faintly 
totalitarian) about this sort of rah-rah advertising.
185
 So the better answer is 
 
 
 179. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
 180. Cf. Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, The Democratic Deficit in the States, 56 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 148, 160, 161–62 tbls.3 & 4 (2012) (finding that state policy congruence is higher for more salient 
policies). 
 181. See supra Part III.C; cf. FAULT LINES, supra note 173, at 8 fig.1 (noting demographic 
differences in civic knowledge scores among secondary school students).  
 182. See infra app. B. 
 183. See infra app. B. 
 184. A similar logic explains why many countries take international athletic success so seriously. 
They hope it will promote greater national pride. See, e.g., Ivo van Hilvoorde et al., How to Influence 
National Pride? The Olympic Medal Index as a Unifying Narrative, 45 INT’L REV. SOC. SPORT 87, 88 
(2010). 
 185. See Tom W. Smith & Seokho Kim, National Pride in Comparative Perspective: 1995/96 and 
2003/04, 18 INT’L J. PUB. OPINION RES. 127, 133 (2006) (noting “elements of national superiority and 
nationalism” present in “general national pride”); see also Leader Says Athletes’ Victories Create 
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that governments that want their citizens to be proud of them should try to 
compile records worth being proud of. They should enact sound policies, 
manage the budget and economy wisely, improve people’s wellbeing, 
protect their safety, and so on. Then jurisdictional pride (and constitutional 
approval) would be the happy side effects of a more successful society.
186
 
The highly abstract nature of these recommendations points to an 
important truth. People’s attitudes toward their constitution are largely 
unrelated to the document itself. Instead, they flow from psychological 
aspects of citizenship, from the feelings engendered by growing up and 
living in a particular time and place. This means that constitutional 
approval is not a project of constitutional design. Rather, like statecraft, it 
is ultimately a project of soulcraft.
187
 
C. Additional Literatures 
Shifting audiences from policymakers back to scholars, we next 
address the implications of our findings for several additional literatures: 
American constitutional law, legal philosophy, sociology, and comparative 
constitutional law. Academics in these areas should find much to cheer in 
our result that constitutional approval is generally high. But they may be 
disquieted by our further conclusion that approval is unaffected by 
constitutional content or congruence. 
Beginning with American constitutional scholars, we observed earlier 
that they have linked support for the constitution to an array of deep 
constitutional values: the charter’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public, the 
likelihood that people will abide by its commands, its durability in the face 
of social change, its ability to justify countermajoritarian judicial review, 
and so on.
188
 Our study sheds no light on whether these connections are 
valid; we did not attempt to quantify any of the putative consequences of 
constitutional backing. But if the connections are valid, then our findings 
are highly encouraging. Since we determined that most people strongly 
approve of their constitutions—especially at the federal level but also at 
 
 
Sense of ‘National Pride,’ TEHRAN TIMES (Jan. 21, 2015) (linking athletic success and national pride 
in authoritarian Iran).  
 186. See TOM W. SMITH & LARS JAKKO, GEN. SOC. SURVEY, NATIONAL PRIDE: A CROSS-
NATIONAL ANALYSIS 15 (1998) (finding in a survey of national pride that it is “greatest in stable, 
established, developed democracies” and “lowest in ex-Socialist states, countries riven by ethnic 
conflict, and nations with war guilt”).  
 187. With apologies to George Will. Cf. GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT: WHAT 
GOVERNMENT DOES (1983).  
 188. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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the state level
189—it follows that several of the most important goals of 
any constitutional order are being achieved in contemporary America. 
Next, a variant of the same point applies to legal positivists (albeit 
stripped of its normative valence). As we noted earlier too, positivists 
believe that if a constitution is widely supported by the public, then it is 
likely to be treated as legally binding.
190
 The document’s status as law, 
that is, stems from its popular acceptance. On this account, given that 
American constitutions are widely supported, it is probable that their legal 
status is unquestioned. They may be good law or bad law—positivism is 
agnostic on the merits—but social realities mean they are, in fact, law. 
A third area to which our results are relevant is the sociological study 
of nationalism and its effects. This literature has distinguished between 
malign and benign nationalism: respectively, the assertion of national 
superiority and patriotic pride in one’s country.191 The literature has 
concluded that while the consequences of malign nationalism are 
(unsurprisingly) negative, this is not the case for patriotism. For example, 
malign nationalism is associated with xenophobia, but patriotism has 
either a negligible link to it or none at all.
192
 Similarly, Elkins and Rui de 
Figueiredo have shown that more patriotic individuals are as likely to 
appreciate outsiders as the average citizen.
193
  
Our findings contribute to this scholarship by revealing another 
positive aspect of patriotism, one not yet documented by existing studies. 
This positive aspect, of course, is the higher constitutional approval 
expressed by people who are prouder of their state or country, which was 
one of the most robust results of our empirical analysis.
194
 It means that 
not only are more patriotic people not xenophobic or suspicious of 
outsiders, they also are stauncher advocates of their jurisdictions’ 
foundational charters. This staunch advocacy may not always be 
 
 
 189. See supra Part III.A. 
 190. See supra notes 26–28 and accompanying text. 
 191. See, e.g., Thomas Blank & Peter Schmidt, National Identity in a United Germany: 
Nationalism or Patriotism? An Empirical Test with Representative Data, 24 POL. PSYCHOL. 289, 291–
96 (2003) (discussing this distinction). 
 192. See, e.g., id. at 303; Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr. & Zachary Elkins, Are Patriots Bigots? An 
Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride, 47 AM. J. POL. SCI. 171, 176–77 tbl.1 (2003); Qiong Li & 
Marilynn B. Brewer, What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American 
Identity After 9/11, 25 POL. PSYCHOL. 727 (2004); Rebeca Raijman et al., What Does a Nation Owe 
Non-Citizens? National Attachments, Perception of Threat and Attitudes Towards Granting 
Citizenship Rights in a Comparative Perspective, 49 INT’L J. COMP. SOC. 195 (2008). 
 193. See de Figueiredo & Elkins, supra note 192, at 186.  
 194. See supra Part IV.C. Though we note that our survey did not explicitly distinguish between 
benign and malign forms of jurisdictional pride. 
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advisable, but on balance it seems like another credit in the ledger of 
patriotic feeling. 
Turning to the international stage, lastly, our work has mixed 
implications for the field of comparative constitutional design. This field 
has long assumed that the constitutional text is vitally important—that, 
depending on its exact configuration, certain goals either will or will not 
be achieved. “[E]very word,” Madison once wrote, “decides a question 
between power and liberty . . . .”195 Emulating his focus on draftsmanship, 
modern scholars and policymakers have hotly debated how choices of 
constitutional language are related to objectives such as economic 
welfare,
196
 stable democracy,
197
 the mitigation of conflict in divided 
societies,
198
 and national pride.
199
  
While our study addresses a narrower question—the impact of 
constitutional design on constitutional approval—its conclusions are 
nevertheless sobering. Constitutional congruence is often seen as a vital 
issue,
200
 but at least in American states, it has no effect on people’s support 
for their constitution. Likewise, the optimal lifespan of a constitution,
201
 its 
optimal length,
202
 and how easy it should be to amend,
203
 all are issues that 
have been animatedly discussed in the literature. But none of these 
features has any impact on U.S. state constitutional approval either. To the 
extent these results are generalizable internationally, constitutional 
designers should be alarmed. Several of their preoccupations seem entirely 
unrelated to one of the key aims of any constitutional regime. 
There is another trend in comparative scholarship, though, with which 
our findings may be more compatible. In recent years, as numerous well-
 
 
 195. James Madison, Charters, NAT’L GAZETTE, Jan. 19, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 191, 191 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). 
 196. See, e.g., Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, The Economic Effects of Constitutions (2003).  
 197. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (2001).  
 198. See, e.g., Constitutional Design for Divided Societies: Integration or Accomodation? (Sujit 
Choudhry ed., 2008).  
 199. See, e.g., Elkins & Sides, supra note 134, at 701–06 (studying impact of institutional and 
constitutional features on national pride in multiethnic societies). 
 200. See, e.g., Versteeg, supra note 47, at 1136. 
 201. See, e.g., ELKINS ET AL., supra note 38, at 1, 12–35 (recounting debate between Jefferson and 
Madison as to optimal constitutional duration). 
 202. See, e.g., Versteeg & Zackin, supra note 38, at 1658–66 (explaining design logic of longer 
constitutions). 
 203. See, e.g., Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, 88 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 355 (1994) (discussing design implications of different amendment rules). 
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written constitutions have failed to live up to their aspirations,
204
 observers 
increasingly have questioned whether there is such a thing as optimal 
design.
205
 This disillusionment has led to a new emphasis on popular 
participation in constitutional drafting and ratification. Instead of being 
penned by unaccountable experts, this emerging literature argues, 
constitutions should be devised by the people themselves in elected 
assemblies featuring widespread popular involvement.
206
 As Richard 
Solomon, head of the U.S. Institute of Peace, summarizes the claim, “well-
conducted processes can . . . contribute to building stable, peaceful states, 
whereas poorly conducted processes most certainly undercut such 
efforts.”207 Among the countries that have followed this advice and crafted 
constitutions through highly participatory processes are South Africa in 
1994,
208
 Uganda in 1995,
209
 Eritrea in 1997,
210
 Thailand in 1997,
211
 
 
 
 204. For example, in recent months it has become clear that the Polish constitution, which was 
written with genuine aspirations to protect democracy and rights, was unable to prevent the newly 
elected right-wing government from packing the court with sympathetic judges. See Tomasz Tadeusz 
Koncewicz, Polish Constitutional Drama: Of Courts, Democracy, Constitutional Shenanigans and 
Constitutional Self-Defense, ICONNECT BLOG (Dec. 6, 2015), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2015/12/ 
polish-constitutional-drama-of-courts-democracy-constitutional-shenanigans-and-constitutional-self-
defense [https://perma.cc/RBT8-RGUD]. For an account of the Polish constitution-making process, 
see MARK BRZEZINSKI, THE STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND (1998). See generally 
Law & Versteeg, supra note 29, at 898–900 (measuring the degree to which constitutions fail to live 
up to their promises). 
 205. See, e.g., Michel Rosenfeld, Modern Constitutionalism as Interplay Between Identity and 
Diversity, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, IDENTITY, DIFFERENCE, AND LEGITIMACY: THEORETICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 3, 35 (Michel Rosenfeld ed., 1994) (“Modern constitutionalism cannot be reduced to 
any particular form or any specific identity or difference.”).  
 206. See, e.g., Louis Aucoin, Introduction to FRAMING THE STATE IN TIMES OF TRANSITION: CASE 
STUDIES IN CONSTITUTION MAKING, at xiii, xiii (Laurel E. Miller ed., 2010) [hereinafter FRAMING THE 
STATE] (suggesting that there exists “an emerging international norm that constitution-making 
processes should be democratic, transparent and participatory”); Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg, 
Theoretical Perspectives on the Social and Political Foundations of Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 3, 33 (Denis J. Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013) 
(describing popular participation as the new “gold standard” in constitutional design).  
 207. Richard H. Solomon, Foreword to FRAMING THE STATE, supra note 206, at xi, xi.  
 208. See Hassen Ebrahim & Laurel E. Miller, Creating the Birth Certificate of a New South 
Africa: Constitution Making After Apartheid, in FRAMING THE STATE, supra note 206, at 111, 133–39 
(recounting widespread, ”distinguishing[, ]and from a comparative constitutionalist perspective, 
precedent-setting,” popular participation in making of 1994 South African Constitution).  
 209. See Aili Mari Tripp, The Politics of Constitution Making in Uganda, in FRAMING THE STATE, 
supra note 206, at 158, 165–69.  
 210. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach, in 
FRAMING THE STATE, supra note 206, at 57, 61–65.  
 211. See Ginsburg et al., supra note 46, at 215; Erik Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of 
Thailand’s 1997 “People’s Constitution”: Be Careful What You Wish For, 48 ASIAN SURV. 373 
(2008) (describing the process of adopting Thailand’s “People’s Constitution”).  
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Ecuador in 2008,
212
 Bolivia in 2009,
213
 Iceland in 2011,
214
 and Ireland in 
an ongoing effort.
215
 
These developments allow us to end this discussion on a more 
uplifting note. When people are more involved in developing their 
country’s constitution, they are likely to become more familiar with, and 
prouder of, the document. Submitting ideas to assemblies, appearing 
personally before these bodies, taking part in focus groups, attending 
meetings and rallies, commenting on proposals on Facebook and Twitter, 
and eventually voting on the proposed text—all of these actions encourage 
people to become more knowledgeable about their constitution, and 
prouder of their own role in its enactment. To reiterate, two of our study’s 
most important findings are that constitutional knowledge and 
jurisdictional pride are closely tied to constitutional approval.
216
 
Accordingly, the new participatory trend, unlike the conventional focus on 
constitutional design, may in fact increase popular support for the 
constitution. 
D. Future Research 
Finally, we offer some suggestions for future research prompted by 
our study. As we have emphasized, constitutional approval has never been 
examined previously. So not surprisingly, our survey results raise at least 
as many questions about the subject as they answer. These questions, in 
our view, fit into three categories: the consequences of support for the 
constitution, its drivers’ determinants, and its comparative aspects.  
Beginning with consequences, legitimacy is the value that most often 
has been linked to approval in the theoretical and empirical literatures.
217
 
 
 
 212. See Phoebe King, Neo-Bolivarian Constitutional Design: Comparing the 1999 Venezuelan, 
2008 Ecuadorian, and 2009 Bolivian Constitutions, in SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 206, at 366, 378–84.  
 213. See id. at 384–92.  
 214. See Anne Meuwese, Popular Constitution-Making: The Case of Iceland, in SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 206, at 469, 476–89. But see Thorvaldur 
Gylfason, Democracy on Ice: A Post-Mortem of the Icelandic Constitution, OPENDEMOCRACY (June 
19, 2013), https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/thorvaldur-gylfason/democracy-on-
ice-post-mortem-of-icelandic-constitution [https://perma.cc/S7KG-Q62L] (analyzing why Iceland’s 
highly participatory document was not ultimately adopted). 
 215. See Tom Arnold, Message from the Chairman, CONVENTION ON THE CONSTITUTION, 
https://www.constitution.ie [https://perma.cc/YP35-ZXR5] (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) (describing 
Ireland’s Convention on the Constitution as partly “made up of 66 citizens, randomly selected and 
broadly representative of Irish society”). 
 216. See supra Part IV.B. 
 217. See supra notes 24–28, 54–57 and accompanying text. 
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Our survey did not ask about legitimacy, but it is not hard to think of poll 
questions that would capture the concept. Notably, in their work on the 
Supreme Court, Caldeira and Gibson have recommended using a battery 
of items relating to whether respondents support major changes to the 
Court’s functions.218 The idea is that if people are willing to back such 
changes, then they are not very loyal to the Court.
219
 Similar questions 
could be posed with respect to fundamental constitutional transformations, 
thus producing a measure of constitutional legitimacy. This measure, in 
turn, could be analyzed in tandem with constitutional approval, thereby 
indicating how (if at all) approval and legitimacy are related. 
Other potential consequences of constitutional approval—in particular, 
constitutional compliance and durability—could be probed without 
carrying out additional surveys.
220
 Metrics of compliance, such as the 
prevalence of violations of constitutionally protected rights, already exist 
(especially at the international level).
221
 These metrics could be paired 
with approval data to evaluate whether constitutions are more likely to be 
followed when they are widely supported. Likewise, scholars have 
compiled the lifespans of hundreds of national constitutions over the past 
two centuries.
222
 This information also could be joined with approval data 
to find out whether popular constitutions are enduring too.  
Shifting from consequences to causes, our study sheds a good deal of 
light on the determinants of constitutional approval. But it reveals much 
less about what determines the determinants—that is, why our key 
independent variables happen to exhibit high or low levels. In some cases, 
this inquiry is not particularly meaningful. For instance, the drivers of 
people’s demographic attributes presumably are broad social and 
economic forces that neither can nor should be tinkered with to make 
people more supportive of their constitutions. Similarly, non-substantive 
constitutional features, such as age, length, and number of amendments, 
tend to be the product of drafting preferences and historical quirks. These 
 
 
 218. These items include: whether Justices who consistently reach unpopular decisions should be 
removed from office, whether the Court should be made less independent, whether the Court should 
have less authority to decide controversial issues, and whether the Court should be abolished 
altogether. See Caldeira & Gibson, supra note 15, at 639–41; Gibson et al., supra note 13, at 363–64; 
Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 27, at 1127–30; Gibson & Nelson, supra note 56, at 167–68.  
 219. See sources cited supra note 218. 
 220. See supra Part I.A (discussing hypothesized effects of constitutional approval). 
 221. One of us previously has found, using these metrics, that many foreign constitutions exhibit 
low levels of compliance. See Law & Versteeg, supra note 29, at 897–912. 
 222. See generally ELKINS ET AL., supra note 38. 
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factors also are not subject to conscious manipulation for the sake of 
boosting constitutional approval. 
On the other hand, our other three sets of variables (involving 
constitutional knowledge, attitudes toward government, and constitutional 
congruence) are neither fixed nor arbitrary. So it would be quite fruitful to 
explore what influences them—especially the first two, whose connection 
to constitutional approval is clearer. Among the potential drivers of 
constitutional knowledge are demographic attributes, education policy, 
marketing campaigns, and high-profile controversies.
223
 It would be 
reasonably straightforward for a study to test these hypotheses and assess 
their validity. Analogously, people’s attitudes toward government may be 
the result of demographics, personality traits, marketing, and 
governmental performance.
224
 A study also could tease apart these 
potential explanations. 
With respect to congruence, the crucial issue is not what causes it 
(since it has such a slight impact on approval), but rather why its impact is 
so slight. Earlier, we posited several possible reasons: people may not 
know the content of their constitutions, they may not feel strongly about 
what their constitutions should include, or they may evaluate constitutions 
differently from other institutions.
225
 All of these reasons could be 
investigated empirically. People could be sorted by their constitutional 
familiarity, in order to determine whether knowledge mediates the effect 
of congruence on approval. People also could be sorted by the strength of 
their constitutional preferences, in case congruence bears on approval only 
for high-intensity individuals. And people could be asked about their 
standards for evaluating different institutions, since the congruence-
approval link may be strongest for those with the same perspective on 
constitutions as on courts and legislatures. 
Lastly, while all of our suggestions could be implemented with 
domestic data, we think they would be even more illuminating in 
comparative perspective. Within the United States, the federal 
Constitution resolves many crucial matters and thus diminishes the 
importance of state constitutions. The latter are notable for their 
substantive and stylistic convergence, as well as for their obscurity relative 
 
 
 223. See supra notes 173–77 and accompanying text; see also supra Part III.C (reporting some 
correlations between self-reported constitutional knowledge and demographic and socioeconomic 
attributes). 
 224. See supra notes 184–86 and accompanying text. 
 225. See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
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to their federal counterpart.
226
 In the international arena, in contrast, 
countries’ constitutions decide essential issues of freedom, structure, and 
governance. They also are highly heterogeneous and quite salient to their 
citizens. 
Accordingly, the comparative study of constitutional approval is both 
significant and likely to yield different conclusions from its domestic 
analogue. All of the variables we examined might be related in unexpected 
ways to people’s support for national rather than subnational constitutions. 
Approval itself also might have novel ties to legitimacy, compliance, and 
durability if they are measured at the country rather than the state level. 
We therefore urge scholars to extend our analysis internationally. Since a 
good deal of data already exists on constitutions around the world,
227
 the 
key missing piece is a global survey comparable to our domestic poll. 
Such a survey undoubtedly would be costly, but it also would yield 
valuable insights into one of the most critical concepts in comparative 
constitutional law. 
CONCLUSION 
In a recent lecture, Sandy Levinson echoed (and extended) Justice 
Kennedy’s musings about constitutional approval. Levinson agreed with 
Justice Kennedy that Americans admire their federal charter, though his 
opinion is that “we ridiculously ‘over-venerate’ the United States 
Constitution.”228 Levinson also addressed people’s attitudes toward their 
state charters, speculating that “few, if any, Americans ‘venerate’ those 
constitutions in the way they do the national constitution.”229 And like 
Justice Kennedy, Levinson hypothesized that support for the Constitution 
is tied to how accurately the document reflects people’s preferences and 
values. “The obvious question is why anyone should ‘venerate’ a 
constitution . . . that produces what might be termed ‘too many instances’ 
of incongruence . . . .”230 
 
 
 226. See Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 83, at 1596–97, 1620–21.  
 227. See, e.g., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http://comparativeconstitutionsproject. 
org/research-design [https://perma.cc/4TK2-94V2] (last visited Mar. 1, 2015) (compiling “data on the 
formal characteristics of written constitutions, both current and historical, for most independent states 
since 1789”). 
 228. Sanford Levinson, Divided Loyalties: The Problem of “Dual Sovereignty” and 
Constitutional Faith, 29 TOURO L. REV. 241, 242 (2013) (emphasis added). 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. at 249. 
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Levinson’s perspective on the law, of course, is very different from 
Justice Kennedy’s. But both observers share the view that constitutional 
approval is vitally important—as well as a complete lack of information 
about it. In this Article, we have taken for granted the significance of 
public backing for the constitution. But we have sought, for the first time, 
to assess empirically whether and why people support their charters. What 
we have found partially confirms and partially rebuts Levinson’s and 
Justice Kennedy’s surmises. Yes, Americans admire their federal 
Constitution, and yes, they admire it more than their state constitutions. 
But no, this esteem does not come from the documents’ congruence with 
their underlying views. It comes, rather, from Americans’ belief in their 
own constitutional familiarity as well as their pride in their state or 
country. Ironically, the wellspring of constitutional approval is ultimately 
non-constitutional.  
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APPENDIX A: FULL SURVEY 
Thank you for considering participating in this study. Please read 
the following information before continuing.  
 Purpose of the research study: The purpose of the study is to 
understand how people think about their state constitution and about 
international law. 
What you will do in the study: If you participate, you will be asked 
some questions about your background and then some questions about 
your opinion on some substantive policies and your state constitution.  
Time required: The study will require about 15 minutes of your time. 
Risks: There are no anticipated risks in this study.  
Benefits: There are no benefits to taking the study. The study may help 
us understand if and how constitutional law reflects popular opinion. If 
you wish, you can send an email message to the researchers and we will 
send you a copy of any manuscripts based on the research (or summaries 
of our results). 
Confidentiality: The information that you give in the study will be 
anonymous, which means that your name will not be collected or linked to 
the data.  
Voluntary participation: Your participation in the study is completely 
voluntary.  
Right to withdraw from the study: You have the right to withdraw 
from the study at any time prior to submission without penalty.  
How to withdraw from the study: If you choose to withdraw, no 
action is required by you. You simply do not submit the online survey if 
you wish to withdraw. You may not withdraw after your materials have 
been submitted because all survey submissions are anonymous.  
Payment: You are compensated for taking this survey. The type and 
amount of compensation depends on your agreement with Survey 
Sampling (SSI). 
If you have questions about the study, contact: 
Mila Versteeg, University of Virginia School of Law, 580 Massie 
Road, Charlottesville, Virginia 22903-1738, (434) 466-8778, 
versteeg@virginia.edu 
If you have questions about your rights in this study (refer to SBS 
Protocol #2014-0325), contact: Tonya R. Moon, Ph.D., Chair, 
Institutional Review Board for the Social and Behavioral Sciences, One 
Morton Dr., Suite 500, University of Virginia, P.O. Box 800392, 
Charlottesville, VA 22908-0392, (434) 924-5999, 
irbsbshelp@virginia.edu, www.virginia.edu/vpr/irb/sbs 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p 113 Stephanopoulos Versteeg book pages 12/12/2016  
 
 
 
 
 
182 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 94:113 
 
 
 
 
First, we’d like to ask you a few questions about yourself: 
What is your gender? 
 Male 
   Female 
    
What year were you born? (e.g., 1979)  
Are you of Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin? 
 Yes 
 No 
    
What is your race? 
 Caucasian 
 African American 
 Asian 
 Native American 
 Pacific Islander 
 Other (please specify) 
    
Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a... 
 Democrat 
 Republican 
 Independent 
 Other (Please specify) 
  
What is the highest educational level or degree that you have obtained? 
 Less than High School 
 High School / GED 
 Some College 
 2-year College Degree 
 4-year College Degree 
 Master’s Degree 
 Ph.D. 
 J.D. 
 M.B.A. 
 Other Professional Degree 
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What is your household income? 
 under $30,000 
 between $30,000 and $50,000 
 between $50,000 and $100,000 
 between $100,000 and $200,000 
 between $200,000 and $500,000 
 over $500,000 
    
How closely do you follow national news? 
 very closely 
 somewhat closely 
 not so closely 
 not closely at all 
    
How closely do you follow local news? 
 very closely 
 somewhat closely 
 not so closely 
 not closely at all 
    
State Laws and Constitutions: 
As you may know, each state has its own constitution, which takes 
precedence over other kinds of state law such as statutes and regulations. 
If ordinary state law conflicts with the state constitution, it is the state 
constitution that has to be followed. State constitutions cannot contradict 
the federal United States Constitution, but they can provide additional 
protections and cover additional areas. 
State legislators often face a choice between including policies in the 
state constitution or in ordinary state law. There are several differences 
between these options. First, when policies are placed in the state 
constitution, they are harder to change in the future. Amending a state 
constitution is always more difficult than amending a regular state law. 
Second, policies that are in the state constitution are often considered 
more “fundamental” than policies in ordinary state law. States 
commonly include policies that they see as especially important in the 
state constitution. And third, policies that are in the state constitution can 
be used by courts to invalidate policies that are in ordinary state law. In 
other words, if ordinary state law violates the state constitution, the 
ordinary state law must be struck down. 
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Which of the following provisions would you like to see included in 
your state’s laws? (Note that we’re asking here about your state’s laws, not 
your state’s constitution.) 
 Yes No 
Right to Unionize: This would allow workers to join unions even when 
their employers object to their membership.  
  
Right to a Minimum Wage: This would ensure a minimum hourly wage 
for all those employed.  
  
Right to a Maximum Number of Working Hours: This would ensure 
that an employer can’t force an employee to work more than the 
maximum number of hours, unless the employee chooses to do so 
voluntarily.  
  
Right to Workplace Safety: This would require the government to 
regulate working conditions so that all workers are guaranteed a safe 
workplace.  
  
Workplace Liability Provision: This would ensure that employers can 
be held accountable for accidents that happen in the workplace and that 
they cannot have employees sign contracts that would release the 
employer from such accountability.  
  
Prohibition of “Closed Shop” Policies: This would prohibit employers 
from hiring members of trade unions only.  
  
Prohibition of Child Labor: This would ensure that children are not 
permitted to work.  
  
Right to Primary Education: This would create an obligation for the 
state to make state-run primary education (grades K-8) available to all.  
  
Right to Secondary Education: This would create an obligation for the 
state to make state-run high-school education available to all.  
  
Obligation to Establish State University: This would create an 
obligation for the state to fund a state university that is available to 
admitted residents at a subsidized rate.  
  
Rights for the Elderly: This would create an obligation for the state to 
take measures to care for the elderly.  
 
 
Rights for the Poor: This would create an obligation for the state to take 
measures to care for the poor.  
  
Rights for the Disabled: This would create an obligation for the state to 
take measures to care for physically or mentally handicapped persons.  
  
Prohibition of Same-Sex Marriage: This would ensure that nobody is 
allowed to marry a partner of the same sex, and would require the 
government to ban such conduct.  
  
Prohibition of Polygamy: This would ensure that nobody is allowed to 
practice polygamy, and would require the government to ban such 
conduct.  
  
Right to Gender Equality: This would ensure that women are treated as 
equal to men by the state.  
  
Victim Rights: This would ensure that victims have information about 
criminal proceedings against those who harmed them, would entitle them 
to apply for compensation, and would give them a limited role in criminal 
proceedings.  
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 Yes No 
Prohibition of the Death Penalty: This would ensure that the death 
penalty is never imposed, even for the worst crimes.  
  
Right to a Healthy Environment: This would create an obligation for 
the state to take measures to protect the natural environment.  
  
Right to Hunt and/or Fish: This would guarantee state residents the 
right to hunt and/or fish on state lands and waters.  
  
Protection of Cultural Heritage: This would require the government to 
preserve the state’s cultural heritage.  
  
Debtors’ Rights: This would ensure that debtors are allowed to keep 
enough property to live with dignity even if they are bankrupt.  
  
Protection of Pensions of Public Employees and Veterans: This would 
require the state to pay pensions to public employees and veterans even 
when the state is in financial crisis.  
  
Limitations on Gambling and Lotteries: This would limit lotteries run 
by private individuals, specify the locations of casinos, and set the taxes 
to be paid by such casinos.  
  
Protection of English as the Official Language: This would ensure that 
English is always available as a language of instruction and for 
communication with the government.  
  
Right to Information: This would ensure that people are able to obtain 
information from the government that concerns them or matters they are 
involved in.  
  
Right to Happiness: This would ensure that people are free to pursue 
personal happiness as they see fit.  
  
Right to Vote: This would guarantee people the ability to participate in 
elections.  
  
 
Which of the following provisions would you like to see included in 
your state’s constitution? (Note that we’re asking here about your state’s 
constitution, not your state’s laws.) 
  Yes  No 
Right to Unionize: This would allow workers to join unions even when 
their employers object to their membership. 
  
Right to a Minimum Wage: This would ensure a minimum hourly wage 
for all those employed.  
  
Right to a Maximum Number of Working Hours: This would ensure 
that an employer can’t force an employee to work more than the 
maximum number of hours, unless the employee chooses to do so 
voluntarily. 
  
Right to Workplace Safety: This would require the government to 
regulate working conditions so that all workers are guaranteed a safe 
workplace. 
  
Workplace Liability Provision: This would ensure that employers can 
be held accountable for accidents that happen in the workplace and that 
they cannot have employees sign contracts that would release the 
employer from such accountability. 
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  Yes  No 
Prohibition of “Closed Shop” Policies: This would prohibit employers 
from hiring members of trade unions only. 
  
Prohibition of Child Labor: This would ensure that children are not 
permitted to work. 
  
Right to Primary Education: This would create an obligation for the 
state to make state-run primary education (grades K-8) available to all. 
  
Right to Secondary Education: This would create an obligation for the 
state to make state-run high-school education available to all. 
  
Obligation to Establish State University: This would create an 
obligation for the state to fund a state university that is available to 
admitted residents at a subsidized rate.  
  
Rights for the Elderly: This would create an obligation for the state to 
take measures to care for the elderly. 
 
 
Rights for the Poor: This would create an obligation for the state to take 
measures to care for the poor. 
  
Rights for the Disabled: This would create an obligation for the state to 
take measures to care for physically or mentally handicapped persons. 
  
Prohibition of Same-Sex Marriage: This would ensure that nobody is 
allowed to marry a partner of the same sex, and would require the 
government to ban such conduct. 
  
Prohibition of Polygamy: This would ensure that nobody is allowed to 
practice polygamy, and would require the government to ban such 
conduct. 
  
Right to Gender Equality: This would ensure that women are treated as 
equal to men by the state. 
  
Victim Rights: This would ensure that victims have information about 
criminal proceedings against those who harmed them, would entitle them 
to apply for compensation, and would give them a limited role in criminal 
proceedings. 
  
Prohibition of the Death Penalty: This would ensure that the death 
penalty is never imposed, even for the worst crimes. 
  
Right to a Healthy Environment: This would create an obligation for 
the state to take measures to protect the natural environment. 
  
Right to Hunt and/or Fish: This would guarantee state residents the 
right to hunt and/or fish on state lands and waters. 
  
Protection of Cultural Heritage: This would require the government to 
preserve the state’s cultural heritage. 
  
Debtors’ Rights: This would ensure that debtors are allowed to keep 
enough property to live with dignity even if they are bankrupt. 
  
Protection of Pensions of Public Employees and Veterans: This would 
require the state to pay pensions to public employees and veterans even 
when the state is in financial crisis. 
  
Limitations on Gambling and Lotteries: This would limit lotteries run 
by private individuals, specify the locations of casinos, and set the taxes 
to be paid by such casinos. 
  
Protection of English as the Official Language: This would ensure that 
English is always available as a language of instruction and for 
communication with the government. 
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  Yes  No 
Right to Information: This would ensure that people are able to obtain 
information from the government that concerns them or matters they are 
involved in. 
  
Right to Happiness: This would ensure that people are free to pursue 
personal happiness as they see fit. 
  
Right to Vote: This would guarantee people the ability to participate in 
elections. 
  
Direct Voter Initiative for Constitutional Amendment: This would 
allow voters to directly amend the state constitution through a statewide 
vote, without needing the approval of the legislature. 
  
In which state do you currently reside? 
Alabama; Alaska; Arizona; Arkansas; California; Colorado; 
Connecticut; Delaware; District of Columbia; Florida; Georgia; 
Hawaii; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana; 
Maine; Maryland; Massachusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; 
Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Hampshire; New Jersey; 
New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; North Dakota; Ohio; 
Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Puerto Rico; Rhode Island; South 
Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; 
Washington; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Wyoming; I do not reside in 
the United States. 
On a scale from 1 to 10, how proud are you of the state you live in? 
Pride  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, how proud are you to live in the United 
States?  
Pride  1 2  3  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, how familiar are you with the content of your 
state’s laws? 
Knowledge  1  2   3  4 5 
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On a scale from 1 to 5, how familiar are you with the content of your 
state’s constitution?  
Knowledge  1  2   3  4  5 
 
 
 
On a scale from 1 to 5, how familiar are you with the content of the 
Federal/United States Constitution? 
Knowledge  1  2   3  4  5 
 
 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you approve of your state’s 
laws? 
Approval 1  2 3  4  5 6  7  8  9  10 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you approve of your state’s 
constitution? 
Approval 1  2 3  4  5 6  7  8  9  10 
 
On a scale from 1 to 10, how much do you approve of the Federal/U.S. 
Constitution? 
Approval 1  2 3  4  5 6  7  8  9  10 
 
Thank you for answering these questions. You are almost done!  
We would now like to ask a few questions about what you have read. 
Earlier, you were told that state constitutions: 
 Are easier to amend than ordinary state law  
 Are more difficult to amend than state law  
    
You were also told that state constitutions: 
 Are more fundamental than ordinary state law  
 Are less fundamental than ordinary state law 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APPENDIX B: OLS RESULTS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Federal State Federal State Federal State State State 
Male 0.3506*** 0.2443* 0.0161 -0.0014 0.1253 0.1492 0.1484 0.1255 
 (0.101) (0.126) (0.087) (0.101) (0.078) (0.090) (0.090) (0.095) 
Age 0.0261*** 0.0111*** 0.0261*** 0.0124*** 0.0165*** 0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0057** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
African 
American 
-0.2319* -0.2889** -0.1522 -0.3611*** -0.2390* -0.2127** -0.2092** -0.2013* 
 (0.116) (0.132) (0.117) (0.114) (0.133) (0.099) (0.100) (0.103) 
Other Race -0.0832 0.1819 0.0011 0.1170 -0.0869 0.0089 0.0108 0.0304 
 (0.142) (0.153) (0.104) (0.116) (0.094) (0.088) (0.089) (0.093) 
Education 0.1105*** 0.0361 0.0247 0.0129 0.0482** 0.0357 0.0342 0.0142 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.027) (0.031) (0.022) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) 
Income 0.0956* 0.1086* -0.0076 -0.0395 -0.0454 -0.0748** -0.0749** -0.0666* 
 (0.053) (0.058) (0.039) (0.042) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) 
Constitutional 
Knowledge 
  0.9778*** 0.9417*** 0.8505*** 0.7072*** 0.7087*** 0.7026*** 
   (0.041) (0.036) (0.043) (0.034) (0.033) (0.038) 
Follow News   0.2404*** 0.3046*** 0.1753*** 0.1125** 0.1131** 0.1302*** 
   (0.045) (0.044) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.046) 
Pride     0.3079*** 0.4447*** 0.4444*** 0.4335*** 
     (0.026) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) 
Republican     0.0256 0.2687*** 0.2661*** 0.2584*** 
     (0.093) (0.088) (0.088) (0.096) 
Democrat     0.0100 0.0811 0.0815 0.0783 
     (0.088) (0.082) (0.081) (0.093) 
Congruence       0.0051 0.0074 
       (0.007) (0.008) 
Constitution 
Age 
       -0.0012 
        (0.001) 
Constitution 
Length 
       0.0000 
        (0.000) 
Amendments        -0.0000 
        (0.000) 
Constant 5.7544*** 5.7192*** 2.1289*** 2.3168*** 0.6167** 0.5560** 0.4904 0.6964* 
 (0.244) (0.291) (0.250) (0.286) (0.256) (0.272) (0.309) (0.362) 
Observations 1,968 1,968 1,968 1,968 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,718 
R-squared 0.103 0.042 0.353 0.320 0.438 0.528 0.528   
Note: Robust standard errors cluster at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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APPENDIX C: ORDERED PROBIT RESULTS 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
  Federal State Federal State Federal State State State 
Male 0.1936*** 0.1228** 0.0226 0.0040 0.0930* 0.1105* 0.1100* 0.0902 
  (0.053) (0.059) (0.054) (0.058) (0.052) (0.062) (0.063) (0.068) 
Age 0.0159*** 0.0054*** 0.0185*** 0.0071*** 0.0133*** 0.0042** 0.0042** 0.0042** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
African American -0.1345** -0.1325** -0.1468** -0.2219*** -0.1962*** -0.1475** -0.1439** -0.1329* 
  (0.055) (0.054) (0.061) (0.054) (0.076) (0.065) (0.065) (0.071) 
Other Race -0.0536 0.0863 0.0030 0.0688 -0.0504 0.0027 0.0036 0.0333 
  (0.078) (0.079) (0.072) (0.071) (0.064) (0.065) (0.065) (0.071) 
Education 0.0472** 0.0163 0.0017 0.0043 0.0195 0.0203 0.0194 0.0073 
  (0.019) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Income 0.0352 0.0525* -0.0193 -0.0294 -0.0481* -0.0516** -0.0517** -0.0511* 
  (0.028) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) 
Knowledge 
  
0.6260*** 0.5703*** 0.5887*** 0.5206*** 0.5213*** 0.5206*** 
  
  
(0.027) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) 
Follow news 
  
0.1529*** 0.1849*** 0.1196*** 0.0958*** 0.0964*** 0.1010*** 
  
  
(0.028) (0.025) (0.027) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) 
Pride 
    
0.2028*** 0.3037*** 0.3036*** 0.3053*** 
  
    
(0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021) 
Republican 
    
0.0564 0.2028*** 0.2014*** 0.2043*** 
  
    
(0.065) (0.071) (0.071) (0.076) 
Democrat 
    
-0.0229 0.0722 0.0716 0.0661 
  
    
(0.053) (0.058) (0.058) (0.067) 
Congruence 
      
0.0029 0.0032 
  
      
(0.005) (0.006) 
Constitution Age 
      
-0.0009 
  
       
(0.001) 
Constitution Length 
      
0.0000 
  
       
(0.000) 
Amendments 
      
-0.0000 
  
       
(0.000) 
Observations 1,968 1,968 1,968 1,968 1,964 1,964 1,964 1,718 
Note: Robust standard errors cluster at state level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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